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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFIC STATES CAST IRON PIPE 
COMPANY, et al. 
and 
ALVIN T. LOCKE, 
Plaintiffs, 
Intervening Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
HARSH UTAH CORPORATION, a cor-
poration, HARSH INVESTMENT COR-
PORATION, a corporation, and HAROLD 
J. SCHNITZER, an individual. 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Respondents Brief 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In this action the plaintiff Locke sought to foreclose 
a mechanic's lien for monies due him as construction 
superintendent on a Wherry Housing Project located at 
Hill Field Air Force Base. He sought to recover a bonus 
due under a contract between the parties for the bidding 
and construction of said Wherry Housing Project. The 
contract provided that the defendant Schnitzer, for fi-
nancing the project, should first receive, out of the pro-
fits of the construction of the project, an amount equal 
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to 10% of the parties' bid for the project, and that of 
the remaining profits, the plaintiff should have 50% as 
a bonus for his services. Locke sought one-half of all 
tlre profits and to eliminate Schnitzer's preference of 
10% upon the grounds that Schnitzer had failed in his 
obligation to finance the project. The Court granted 
plaintiff judgment for one-half of the profits, after 
deducting Schnitzer's 10% and Schnitzer and the other 
defendants appeal'ed. Locke cross appeals, contending 
that the Court should have eliminated Schnitzer's pre-
ferred 10% and also contending that the court should 
have allowed a larger profit arising out of additional 
work and services performed under the construction 
contract pursuant to "change orders" executed between 
Harsh Utah Corporation as the owner corporation and 
Harsh Investment Corporation as the contracting corpo-
ration. 
Inasmuch as respondent-intervening plaintiff, Alvin 
T. Locke, controverts the appellants' statement of facts 
in certain particulars, he feels obligated to set forth 
below specific reasons requiring him to refute the state-
ment of facts of appellants. 
Appellants, in their statement of facts, from Page 
2 through Page 41 of their brief, make many broad and 
sweeping statements completely unsupported by, and con-
trary to, the evidence and record. 
Appellants engage in speculation and theory 
throughout their entire brief with absolutely no refer-
ence to the records in many respects, as required by 
rule. It is submitted that appellants cannot support 
their theory by the actual r'ecord. 
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During the trial of the action, appellants' apparent 
defense to the claims of respondent was a campaign 
to discredit th'e character and reputation of respond-
ent, and inasmuch as this attack completely failed, ap-
pellants now, before this Court, make an attempt at a 
new defense, based upon theory, and completely un-
supported by the evidence and r'ecord. 
Respondent, in his reply brief, will not attempt to 
answer appellants' arguments based upon matters not 
within, and completely foreign to, the record of the trial 
Court below, such as the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
report which is not a part of the trial record in any way 
whatsoever. Respondent will, consistently and unequivo-
cally, in this brief make only such statements of fact 
and present only such argument as can and will be sup-
ported by the record, with complete and accurate refer-
ence to the record in each instance. 
During the course of this trial two different reporters 
were used. The transcript, therefore, is as follows: That 
portion of the trial reported by Cecil E. Tucker is in 
Volume I (R. 283), Pages 1 through 599 and Volume II 
(R. 284), Pages 600 through 1165 and will be referred 
to as (T.(page number) throughout respondent's brief. 
The remaining record, being the transcript reported by 
J. L. :May (R. 285 ), Pages 1 through 250, will be re-
ferred to throughout respondents brief as (T. page num-
ber-M), indicating in each instance May's transcript, No. 
285 of the Record. 
Respondent further observes and directs this Court's 
attention to the fact that apparently in transmitting the 
official record to this Court, the Court below forwarded 
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all 'exhibits pertaining to trials by various plaintiffs 
against the appellants and that many of them were not 
referred to or used in the trial between respondent and 
appellants. 
Respondent has further observed that the official 
record of the proceedings, when received by respondent, 
was marked with pencil marks in a good many instances 
and various pages thereof had b'een folded and marked 
with paper clips. Respondent desires to point out that 
respondent's attorneys have, in no way, marked or 
placed any paper clips or other foreign substances upon 
the official record of tlle Court below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
IN RE BACKGROU.ND AND PRELIMINARY 
AGREEMENTS BETWEEiN THE PARTIES 
Respondent Locke met appellant Schnitzer on June 
21st, 1951, at Portland, Oregon, (T. 26-M; 854-855), not 
"shortly before June of 1951", as asserted by appellants 
on Page 3 of their brief. Previous to this meeting Locke 
had been engaged in the construction business as a 
general construction superintendent on large housing 
projects. Schnitzer had recently sold an interest in a 
family business and was looking for an opportunity to 
invest his capital. 
The parties, Locke and Schnitzer, entered into their 
first agreement, Ex. 156, on the day of their first me·et-
ing, June 21st, 1951 (T. 26-M; 854-855). This agreement 
is set forth on Page 1 of the appendix to appellants' 
brief. By the terms of this agreem'ent, Locke was to 
furnish to Schnitzer certain technical information re-
garding the bidding and the acquisition of a Wherry 
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Housing Project at Deseret Chemical Depot in Utah. 
For this assistance Schnitzer was to pay Locke $50,000.00 
out of profits. The parties were not successful bidders 
on this project and no monies were paid to Locke under 
this agreement. 
Between June 21st, 1951 and July 24th, 1951, both 
Locke and Schnitzer made further investigation per-
taining to the Wherry Housing Project at Deseret 
Chemical Depot in Utah. In Salt Lake City on July 
24th, 1951, Schnitzer and Locke 'entered into their second 
agreement, Ex. 157, which is set forth on Page 3 of the 
appendix to appellants' brief. This agreement was a 
joint venture pertaining to the construction and owner-
ship of the Wh'erry Housing Project at the Deseret 
Chemical Depot. By the terms of this agreement, 
Schnitzer was guaranteed a return of $150,000.00 from 
profits and all remaining profits were to be divided 
equally betwe'en the parties. The $150,000.00 was 10% 
of the amount of the proposed bid of $1,500,000.00 on this 
project. (T. 861 ) The parties were not the success-
ful bidders on this project. 
Between July 24th, 1951 and August 29th, 1951, 
Locke and Schnitzer procured plans and specifications 
for three additional Wherry Housing Projects located 
at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona, Hill Field 
Air Force Base in Utah and Great Falls Air Force Base 
at Great Falls, Montana. They subsequently submitted 
bids on all three projects, pursuant to an "Invitation for 
Proposal", Ex. 228. This exhibit pertained to Hill Field 
Air Force Base Housing Project and similar invitations 
were issued pertaining to the Great Falls, Montana, Air 
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Force Base Housing Project and Davis-Monthan Air 
Force Bas'e Housing Project. 
On August 29th, 1951, Schnitzer and Locke at 
Portland, Oregon, entered into their third agreement, 
Ex. 158, set forth on Page 5 of the appendix to appel-
lants' brief. This agreement p'ertained to the bidding 
of the above mentioned three projects and provided that 
Schnitzer was to furnish the necessary capital and Locke 
was to provide his services to sup'ervise the construction 
of said projects. This agreement further provided for 
a guaranteed return to Schnitzer of a sum equal to 10% 
of the total monies received from the Government for 
such construction. It further provided for a division 
of profits equally beween Locke and Schnitzer. This 
agreement, like the second agr·eement, was a joint ven-
ture agreement between Locke and Schnitzer to con-
struct and to own the leasehold improvements on th'e 
Wherry Housing Projects therein mentioned. Essen-
tially, Schnitzer's obligation was to provide the neces-
sary capital and Locke's obligation was to supply the 
construction knowledge and ability in the capacity of 
construction sup'erintendent to supervise the building of 
said projects. 
IN RE REQUIREMENTS PERTAINING TO 
WHERRY HOUSING PROJECTS. 
It is important at this point to examine the record 
to determine what knowledge the parties had pertaining 
to a Wherry Housing Project and the obligations of the 
parties interested in said Wherry Housing Projects as 
well as the benefits acquired incident to the ownership 
and construction of said projects. The Invitation for 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Proposal, Ex. 228, under date of August 2nd, 1951, and 
the Administrative Rules and Regulations for Military 
Housing Insurance under Title VIII of the National 
Housing Act, Ex. 3, clearly set forth the program. These 
documents themselves clearly refute appellant's con-
tention that th'e only funds available for the construction 
of the Wherry Housing Project were the proceeds of 
the mortgage, and further clearly refute appellants' con-
tention pertaining to the financial obligations of Schnit-
zer and Harsh Utah Corporation as th'e owner-managing 
corporation. For sake of clarity, the following is a sum-
marization of the various provisions of the Wherry 
Housing program. 
1. A Wherry Housing Project is provided for by 
a program under the Wherry Act whereby military 
housing units are built on Government-owned military 
bases by private corporations. The F. H. A. rules and 
regulations, Ex. 3, provide the control for the financing 
and construction pertaining to the projects. 
(a) Pursuant to the Invitation for Proposal, Ex. 
228, bids are submitted by a sponsor to own a leasehold 
interest granted by the Government and to build th'ereon 
the housing facilities contemplated. The Lease, Ex. 251 
provides for a land rental annually of $100.00 per year 
for 75 years. 
(b) A successful, qualified sponsor, submitting th'e 
low bid, must then enter into certain negotiations, pre-
paratory to construction. The Invitation for Proposal, 
Ex. 228, among other things, provides, Paragraph 6. 
thereof, as follows: 
"Sponsors are advised that the approved rental 
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schedule will be based upon a 'net return', not ex-
ceeding 6lj2 % of the sponsor's estimated replace-
ment cost or the F. H. A. estimate of r'eplacement, 
whichever is the lower . . . . . " 
The Invitation for Proposal further provides, Para-
graph 7 thereof, as follows: 
"Sponsors are advised that the rnaximum ap-
proved amount of insurable mortgage ,,·ill in no 
event exceed 90% of the sponsor's total ·estimated 
replacement cost stipulated in said proposal." 
This terminology in the above mentioned exhibit made 
it clear to both Locke and Schnitzer at an ·early date 
that additional funds over and above the mortgage would 
be required. This is unquestionably the reason for the 
provision in the agreement betwe'en the parties provid-
ing for a 10% return of the amount of the bid to Schnit-
zer. Before any division of profit, Schnitzer was re-
quired to furnish all additional funds required over the 
mortgage proceeds to assure successful completion of 
the projects and to establish the equity of ownership. 
(c) The initial Invitation for Proposal above re-
ferred to also clearly s'ets forth other require1nents per-
taining to mortgage financing. Tlle Application for 
Mortgage Insurance, Ex. 187, and the Land Lease, Ex. 
251, in addition thereto set forth the maximum allow-
able insurance mortgage in the amount of $2,904,000.00 
and the F. H. A. total replacement cost of $3,226,737.00. 
(d) At the time th'e bid was submitted the sponsor 
was required to submit an Application for Mortgage 
Insurance, Ex. 187. The application clearly provided 
that the sponsor must submit financial schedules show-
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ing the sources of the equity that the sponsor would be 
requir'ed to have in said projects (the above mentioned 
10% ). Ex. 187 shows that this equity would be furnished 
by advances from Schnitzer totalling $500,000.00. The 
document was signed by Harold J. Schnitzer on August 
28th, 1951. 
2. Under the Wherry Housing Act, a successful 
bidder must complete the requirements of the Commis-
sioner of F. H. A. under the rules and regulations, Ex. 
3, and, among other things, complete the following: 
(a) Form an F. H. A. owning corporation to act in 
the capacity of lessee under the Lease, Mortgagor under 
the Mortgage and owner under the Construction Con-
tract - "Lump Sum". 
(b) The owning corporation must then enter into 
a construction contract for th~ construction of the pro-
ject. The construction company must complete the pro-
ject within a period of 24 months; Ex. 61. 
(c) Upon completion of the project and acceptance 
by the F. H. A., the Mortgage, Ex. 63, is then transferred 
from a private lending institution, Irving Trust Com-
pany, to the F'ederal National Mortgage Insurance As-
sociation. The owning corporation is then in active 
management and control of the project, collecting all of 
the rental proceeds from said project and has a period 
of 33 lj3 years to retire the existing mortgage on its 
property. The rules and regulations of the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue, provide that the owning corporation 
is allowed to totally depreciate the project for income 
tax purposes over the same period of the loan, that is, 
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over331/3 years, and this depreciation schedule results, 
insofar as income taxes are concern'ed, in tax-free in-
come to said owning corporation. The evidence will 
disclose that, insofar as the Hill Field Air Force Base 
is concerned, the minimum tax-free income r'eceived by 
the owning corporation is in excess of $30,000.00 per 
year (T. 1135) and a greater amount pertaining to the 
Great Falls, Montana, Air Force Base Housing Project 
and the Barstow, California, Marin'e Corps Housing 
Project, for a total annual income to the corporations 
controlled by appellant Schnitzer of approximately 
$100,000.00 per year (T. 1007-1010, 1134-1136). 
IN RE FINAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES 
Subsequent to August 29th, 1951, Schnitzer and 
Locke submitted bids for the above mentioned thre'e 
Wherry Housing Projects, to-wit: Hill Field Air Force 
Base Housing Project, Great Falls Air Force Base 
Housing Project and Davis-Monthan Air Force Base 
Housing Project. However, due to the widespread loca-
tions of the projects, they only accepted two of the con-
tracts, to-wit, those pertaining to Hill Field Air Force 
Base Housing Project and Great Falls, Montana, Air 
Force Base Housing Project. 
Between August 29th, 1951, and Octob'er 4th, 1951, 
Schnitzer and Locke entered into another written agree-
ment and during the course of the trial, respondent de-
manded that app'ellants produce this agreement. They 
did not do so. (T. 981, 31M, 177M) The testimony per-
taining to the terms and conditions of this agreement is 
10 
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to the effect that Locke's ownership interest was reduced 
from 50% to 10%. (T. 31M-32M, 41M, 177M). The final 
agre·ement entered into between the parties, which is the 
subject matter of the litigation herein, was executed on 
October 4th, 1951, Eoc. 162, and is set forth beginning 
on Page 7 of the appendix to appellants' brief. By the 
terms and conditions of this agre'ement, any ownership 
interest theretofore held by Locke in the above men-
tioned projects was eliminated. This was caused by 
representations made to Locke by Schnitzer to the effect 
that inasmuch as they were undertaking more than one 
Wherry Housing Project that it would be necessary for 
Schnitzer to dispose of stock interest in the ownership 
corporations in order to complete his part of the agree-
ment to provide the necessary financing of said pro-
jects. (T. 32M-33M, 41M, 77-79) Because of these 
representations, Locke was induced to give up his owner-
ship interest theretofor'e held under the terms and con-
ditions of the previous agreements, Exs. 157, and 158. 
However, after Schnitzer successfully prevailed upon 
Locke to part with his ownership interest, lle did not, at 
any time, dispose of any of the stock of the ownership 
corporations and did not perform the obligations re-
quired of him to provide necessary financing for said 
projects, as will be set forth in greater detail subse-
quently in this brief. 
The agreement of October 4th, 1951, Ex. 162, also 
included as a party the Harsh Investment Corporation. 
This was a corporation owned by Schnitzer prior to his 
becoming acquainted with Locke and the record will 
show, contrary to the contentions of appellants on Page 
3 of their brief, who claimed that this corporation was 
11 
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not then in existance, that this corporation was, in fact, 
incorporated by Harold J. Schnitzer in the State of 
Oregon on March 30th, 1950 (T. 1), Ex. 160. The bids 
her'etofore referred to had been submitted by Locke and 
Schnitzer before October 4th, indicating that the sponsor 
would be Harsh Investment Corporation and the builder 
the Schnitzer Construction Co. (T. 80-81, 786) How-
ever, the Schnitzer Construction Co. was never used by 
the parties. The agreement of October 4th, 1951, pro-
vided for a salary to Locke in the amount of $1,000.00 
per month and in addition thereto provided "from the 
net profits earned by Harsh in connection with the con-
struction of the aforesaid projects there shall first be 
retain'ed by Harsh a sum of money equal to 10% of the 
total amount of the bids made by Harsh and accepted 
by the Government on the aforesaid projects and from 
the remaining net profits earned by Harsh as aforesaid 
there shall be paid to Locke 50% thereof by way of 
bonus." The agreement further provided that in the 
event the projects were built by any company other than 
a company in which Schnitzer had an interest that Locke 
was to receive as a bonus a minimum of $15,000.00 per 
project and a maximum of $25,000.00 per project. How-
ever, although negotiations were carried on with the Vitt 
Construction Co. and the Utah Construction Co. to act 
as the builder and contractor for the entire projects 
(T. 785 Ex. 227), these negotiations were never com-
pleted and subsequently Schnitzer caused the Harsh Con-
struction Co. to be incorporated to act as the construc-
tion corporation in Montana and California (T. 119, 120) 
and designated the Harsh Investment Corporation to be 
the contractor of the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing 
12 
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Project (T. 119,120). 
IN RE ACTIVITIES OF THE PARTIES PURSUANT 
TO THE AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 4th, 1951. 
Subsequent to October 4th, 1951, and pursuant to 
the rules and regulations for Wherry Housing, the Cer-
tification of Need for Military Housing was issued by 
the Secretary of the Air Force on November 14th, 1951, 
Ex. 227. This document designated Harsh Investment 
Corporation as sponsor and the builder as Herbert Vitt. 
However, subsequently an amended Certification of 
Need for Military Housing was issued and the sponsor 
was changed to Harsh Utah Corporation, and the builder 
was designated as Harsh Investment Corporation. Under 
the direction of the Secretary of the Air Force and the 
F. H. A., certain requirements had to be met and nego-
tiations in this regard were carried on by both Locke 
and Schnitzer in the intervening period between October 
4th, 1951 and July 21st, 1952, which was the date re-
ferred to as the final closing of all of the requirements 
under the Administrative Rules and Regulations here-
inabove referred to. Both Schnitzer and Locke, on be-
half of Harsh Utah Corporation, began negotiations with 
a private !'ending institution, the Irving Trust Co., to 
obtain a construction loan pursuant to the Application 
for Mortgage Insurance, Ex. 187, hereinabove referred 
to. On 1'Iay 29th, 1952, the F. H. A. issued its Com-
mitment for Mortgage Insurance, Ex. 186, to the Harsh 
Utah Corporation as sponsor and mortgagor and to the 
Irving Trust Co. as mortgagee, s·etting forth therein the 
terms and conditions of the F.H.A. Mortgage Insurance, 
Ex. 186. By the terms and conditions of said exhibit, 
13 
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it is provided as follows in Section (h) (2) thereof, Page 
2: 
"Funds, (if any) required over and above mort-
gage proceeds for completion of the project .... 
$727,742.00 ... The said fund 1nay be reduced 
by so much of said Builder's and Architect'1' fPP~, 
up to a maximum of $146,522.00, as the closing 
documents show are not to be paid for in cash". 
In this instance, this amount was the contractor's fee 
which was waived by Harsh Investment Corporation 
thereby reducing the amount of funds required to be 
placed in Harsh Utah Corporation by Schnitz·er (T. 336; 
1155). 
On July 9th, 1952, the F. H. A. issued its Financial 
Requirements for Closing pertaining to the Hill Field 
Air Force Base Housing Project, Ex. 188. By the terms 
and conditions of this document, and in particular Item 
20 thereof, it shows "cash to be deposited in an escrow 
by mortgagor to complete above requirements, $585,-
442.00." This amount is in addition to Item 27 on said 
exhibit, "Total cash allocated to construction, $2,995,-
205.00". This document was issued by F.H.A. pursuant 
to the rules and regulations, Ex. 3, and preliminary to 
th'e execution of the Building and Loan Agreement, Ex. 
64, and the Mortgage, Ex. 63, which were executed on 
the 21st day of July, 1952, also in accordance with the 
rules and regulations, Ex. 3. 
By the terms and conditions of the Building and 
Loan Agreement, Ex. 64, and in particular Paragraph 
5 thereof, Page 2, it is provided as follows : 
"The Borrower agrees that any sum or sums re-
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quired for the construction of th'e project over 
and above the proceeds of the loan and deposited 
with the Lender for that purpose shall be ad-
vanced by the Lender to the Borrower prior to 
the advance of any proceeds of the loan; and the 
Borrower covenants that it will receive all ad-
vances hereunder as a tntst fund to be applied 
first for the purpose of paying for the cost of 
improvements before using any part of the total 
of the same for any other purpose, but nothing 
herein shall impose upon the Lender any obliga-
tion to see to the proper application of such ad-
vances by the Borrower." (Italics supplied.) 
The above referred to exhibits, the Financial Require-
ments for Closing, Ex. 188, and the Building and Loan 
Agreement, Eoc. 64, clearly set forth that the cash re-
quirements over and above the proceeds of the mortgage 
that must be furnished by Schnitzer under the terms and 
conditions of the agreement of October 4th, 1951, with 
Locke are in the total amount of $651,690.00. This docu-
mentary evidence clearly refutes appellants' contention 
throughout their brief that the only proceeds intended 
to be available for the construction of the Hill Field Air 
Force Base Housing Project were the proceeds of the 
mortgage. This is further established by the rules and 
regulations, Ex. 3, which, in Section V, Sub-paragraph 2., 
Page 7 provide as follows : 
"The mortgagor must establish in a manner satis-
factory to the Commissioner that, in addition to 
the proce'eds of the insured mortgage, the mort-
gagor has funds sufficient to assure completion 
of construction of the project. The Commis-
sioner may require such funds, if any, to be de-
posited with and held by the mortgagee in a 
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special account or with an acceptable trustee or 
escrow agent under an appropriate agreement ap-
proved by the Commissioner which will require 
such funds to be expended for work and material 
on th:e physical improvements prior to the ad-
vance of any mortgage money." 
Also on July 21st, 1952, appellant Schnitzer, on be-
half of Harsh Utah Corporation, as owner, and the 
Harsh Investment Corporation, as contractor, 'executed 
the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum", Ex. 61. By 
the terms and conditions of this agreement Harsh Utah 
Corporation as owner was to pay to Harsh Investment 
Corporation as contractor the sum of $2,995,205.00 for 
the construction of the Hill Field Air Force Base Hous-
ing Project. 
By the terms of said Ex. 61, the Plans and Specifi-
cations, Ex. 1, are incorporated therein. The Plans and 
Specifications provide how certain "change order ex-
tras" between the owner and the contractor are to b'e 
obtained. This will be discussed in more detail sub-
sequently in this brief. Appellants contend, on Pages 
15, 16 and 17, of their brief, that the amount contained 
in the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum" was dictated 
by the rules and regulations of F. H. A. This is con-
trary to the evidence submitted by respondent and is 
absolutely contrary to the testimony of appellants' own 
witness, Walter E. Hutchinson, who stated under cross 
examination that the F.H.A. did not dictate in any man-
ner the amount of the Construction Contract-"Lump 
Sum". This was further corroborated by the testimony 
of W. Harold Warwick, Chief Mortgage Examiner for 
F.H.A. The testimony pertaining to this fact is set 
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forth on Pages 5-7; 22 of the app'endix to this brief. 
Subsequent to October 4th, 1951, Locke fulfilled his 
duties and obligations under the terms and conditions 
of the agreement of October 4th, 1951, and in the capacity 
of general construction superintendent successfully com-
pleted the construction of the Hill Field Air Force Base 
Housing Project and the Great Falls, Montana, Air 
Force Base Housing Project. 
Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the agree-
ment of October 4th, 1951, between the parties, Harold 
J. Schnitzer did provide certain funds necessary under 
the above referred to rules and regulations and other 
documents for the financing of the Hill Field Air Force 
Base Housing Project. However, in violation of the 
provisions of the Building and Loan Agreement, Ex. 64, 
the F.H.A. rules and regulations, Ex. 3 and in violation 
of the agreement of October 4th, 1951, with Locke, these 
funds were withdrawn within a short period of time. 
Schnitzer's activities in this regard are set forth in the 
next sub-division of this brief. 
IN RE SCHNITZE<R'S FAILURE TO FINANCE 
THE PROJECT 
On July 21st, 1952, Schnitzer did cause to be de-
posited certain funds in escrow totalling $611,200.00 (T. 
140; 143-146; 163-168) Under the terms and conditions 
of the Committment for Mortgage Insurance and the 
Building and Loan Agreement, thes'e funds were to re-
main on deposit as trust funds for the payment of sub-
contractors and materialmen and for payment of the 
Construction Contract-"Lump Sum" hereinabove re-
ferred to. The testimony during the cours'e of trial of-
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fered by W. Harold Warwick of F.H.A. and substan-
tiated by appellants' own witness, Walter E. Hutchinson, 
was to the effect that the above mentioned mnount wm; 
an escrow fund deposited with the Irving Trust Co. as 
mortgagee and was paid out pursuant to requisitions of 
funds to pay for certain project costs and installments 
on the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum". (T. 829-
833, 1117-1121) See appendix Pages 11-15; 16-21. Con-
trary to the representations made by Schnitzer to Locke 
that he would have to dispose of shares of stock in the 
owning corporation to raise the necessary funds, Schnit-
zer did not hypothecate any of said stock to procure these 
funds but borrowed a total of $200,000.00 from his 
father-in-law, the sum of $300,000.00 from the First 
National Bank of Portland and in violation of the trust 
fund provision pertaining to the Montana Project, 
transferred $97,000.00 from Harsh Construction Com-
pany in Montana, which was in violation of his agree-
ment with Locke pertaining to the Montana project. In 
addition to these funds, he did transfer $14,200.00 from 
his own personal bank account to Harsh Utah Corpora-
tion. The above indicates the sources of funds used by 
Schnitzer to create the 'escrow fund with Irving Trust 
Co. hereinabove referred to. 
Under the terms and conditions of the F.H.A. rules 
and regulations, the Building and Loan Agreement, and 
tire Application for Mortgage Insurance hereinabove set 
forth, and his agreement with Locke, Schnitzer could not 
legally use any of the above mentioned funds for his own 
use and benefit. These funds were committed to estab-
lish his 10% 'equity in said project and to provide Harsh 
Utah Corporation with sufficient funds with which to 
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pay the obligations of Harsh Utah Corporation as will 
be discussed in detail hereinafter in this brief, and to 
pay to Harsh Investment Corporation the amount of the 
"Construction Contract-Lump Sum" plus extras. 
Under the above mentioned rules and r'egulations 
and by the terms of the Commitment for Mortgage 
Insurance and the Mortgage itself, as well as the Build-
ing and Loan Agreement, Irving Trust Co., as mort-
gagee, made advancements throughout the building of 
the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project in ac-
cordance with certain requisitions submitted by the con-
tractor during the course of construction. Attached to 
each of said requisitions, which were initiated by Harsh 
Investment Corporation as contractor, r'equesting funds 
from Harsh Utah Corporation as owner-mortgagor, was 
a certification for purposes of obtaining mortgage in-
surance from the F .H.A. on the mortgage proceeds ad-
vanced, that the funds advanced by the Irving Trust Co. 
were for the purposes of paying for the expenses of 
sub-contractors and materialmen as well as for the the 
expenses of Harsh Investment Corporation as builder. 
The documents executed in order to obtain these funds 
are a part of the record and are Ex. 141. They certify 
that all of the funds therein requested were disbursed 
for the construction of the Hill Field Air Force Base 
Housing Project. 
In violation of the F.H.A. rules and regulations, 
the Mortgage, the Commitment for Mortgage Insurance, 
the Building and Loan Agreement and contrary to the 
certification made to F.H.A. for insurance on mortgage 
advances and th'e requisitions of funds from Irving 
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Trust Co., Ex. 141, hereinabove referred to, and in viola-
tion of the agreement of October 4th, 1951 with Locke, 
appellant Schnitzer wrongfully and illegally withdrew 
funds between N ov'ember 5th, 1952 and March 24th, 1953, 
from both Harsh Investment Corporation and Harsh 
Utah Corporation in the total amount of $631,000.00 
(T. 1094, 1095). These withdrawals are $19,800.00 in 
excess of any funds provided by Schnitzer pertaining to 
the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project. The 
testimony during the course of the trial by W. Harold 
Warwick, Pages 13 to 15 of the appendix; by William 
Ellis; Pages 38 and 39 of the appendix; and by Walter 
E. Hutchinson, Secretary of Harsh Utah Corporation, 
Pages 16 to 21 of the appendix, was to the effect that 
because of the withdrawal of thes'e funds it was impos-
sible for Harsh Utah Corporation as owner to have suf-
ficient funds to pay for the necessary expense of the 
project and to pay to Harsh Investment Corporation the 
amount of tlle Construction Contract- "Lump Sum". 
Respondent submits that this is in direct violation of the 
terms and conditions contemplated by the parties when 
they executed their agreement of October 4th, 1951. 
Schnitz'er was not entitled to withdraw any funds 
until the completion of the project and it had been ac-
cepted by the Government, and a declaration of the 
profits made between the parties. This would have 
been, at the earliest, in July of 1954, or, to accept the 
date argued by appellants in their brief, January of 
1955, when th'e project was finally completed and ac-
cepted. 
The unlawful manipulation of funds by Schnitzer 
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hereinabove referred to, his illegal withdrawal of 
$631,000.00 from Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh 
Investment Corporation and the activities of Schnitzer 
and Hutchinson in preparing false and fraudulent cor-
porate resolutions during the course of the trial in the 
Court below in an attempt to mislead the trial Court 
and defraud Locke will be set forth in detail in respond-
'ent's brief on cross appeal. 
IN RE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
The trial Court properly distinguished between con-
struction costs and project costs. Appellants, through-
out their brief, attempt to show that Schnitzer, Harsh 
Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation 
are to be considered as a singl'e unit and attempt further 
to show that the only proceeds available for the con-
struction of Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project 
were the receipts of the mortgage. In accordanc'e with 
the preponderance of the evidence, which was established 
even by appellants' own witnesses, the trial court prop-
erly distinguished between exp'enses that were to be paid 
by Harsh Utah Corporation as owner, including the 
amount of the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum" and 
the expenses to be paid by Harsh Investment Corpor-
ation as contractor. (See Appendix, Pages 4 to 7.) 
The trial Court properly found that in computing 
the bonus to which Locke would be entitled under the 
terms and conditions of the contract of October 4th, 
1951, that the income was as follows: 
1. The amount of the Construction Contract 
-"Lump Sum", $2,995,205.00. 
2. The amount of the change order 'extras in 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the sum of $178,672.00. However, pertaining to 
this figure, the Court selected the amount in ac-
cordance with the evidence by which the nwrtgage 
would be increased rather than the sum of 
$333,952.55 represtning the total an1ount pursuant 
to the actual agreements betwe·en Harsh Utah 
Corporation as owner and Harsh Investment Cor-
poration as builder. This is the subject matter 
of Point I of respondent's brief on cross appeal. 
3. The net amount of the r'ental income re-
ceived during the construction period of twenty-
four months in the amount of $165,886.49. 
The trial Court properly determined the amount of 
the construction costs pertaining to the Hill Field Air 
Force Base Housing Project as follows: 
1. Direct construction costs, $2,656,457.21. 
2. Indirect construction costs, to wit, general 
overhead, $45,631.34. This amount was the actual 
amount of overhead pertaining to Harsh Con-
struction Co. in Montana which involved th'e con-
struction of 400 units against 350 in Utah and the 
expenditure of considerably more money. Ac-
cording to the testimony, Harsh Construction Co. 
was not engaged in any other business while 
Harsh Investment Corporation, during the course 
of construction, was engag·ed in a considerable 
number of activities and expended $1,040,000.00 
on items not pertaining to the construction of 
Hill Field (T. 450, 475, 1093) and according to 
the testimony of William Ellis, controller for 
Harsh Investment Corporation, no allocation of 
over head expenses was made on the books of 
Harsh Investment Corporation (T. 1043-1044). 
3. The sum of $69,557.31 which sum is the ad-
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hereinabove referred to, his illegal withdrawal of 
$631,000.00 from Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh 
Investment Corporation and the activities of Schnitzer 
and Hutchinson in preparing false and fraudulent cor-
porate resolutions during the course of the trial in the 
Court below in an attempt to mislead the trial Court 
and defraud Locke will be set forth in detail in respond-
'ent's brief on cross appeal. 
IN RE TRIAL COURT'S DffiCISION 
The trial Court properly distinguished between con-
struction costs and project costs. Appellants, through-
out their brief, attempt to show that Schnitzer, Harsh 
Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation 
are to be considered as a singl'e unit and attempt further 
to show that the only proceeds available for the con-
struction of Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project 
were the receipts of the mortgage. In accordance with 
the preponderance of the evidence, which was established 
even by appellants' own witnesses, the trial court prop-
erly distinguished between exp'enses that were to be paid 
by Harsh Utah Corporation as owner, including the 
amount of the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum" and 
the expenses to be paid by Harsh Investment Corpor-
ation as contractor. (See Appendix, Pages 4 to 7.) 
The trial Court properly found that in computing 
the bonus to which Locke would be entitled under the 
terms and conditions of the contract of October 4th, 
1951, that the income was as follows: 
1. The amount of the Construction Contract 
-"Lump Sum", $2,995,205.00. 
2. The amount of the change order 'extras in 
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the sum of $178,672.00. However, pertaining to 
this figure, the Court selected the amount in ac-
cordance with the evidence by which the mortgage 
would be increased rather than the sum of 
$333,952.55 represtning the total amount pursuant 
to the actual agreements betwe'en Harsh Utah 
Corporation as owner and Harsh Investment ( 10r-
poration as builder. This is the subject matter 
of Point I of respondent's brief on cross appeal. 
3. The net amount of the r'ental income re-
ceived during the construction period of twenty-
four months in the amount of $165,886.49. 
The trial Court properly determined the amount of 
the construction costs pertaining to the Hill Field Air 
Force Base Housing Project as follows: 
1. Direct construction costs, $2,656,457.21. 
2. Indirect construction costs, to wit, general 
overhead, $45,631.34. This amount was the actual 
amount of overhead pertaining to Harsh Con-
struction Co. in Montana which involved the con-
struction of 400 units against 350 in Utah and the 
expenditure of considerably more money. Ac-
cording to the testimony, Harsh Construction Co. 
was not engaged in any other business while 
Harsh Investment Corporation, during the course 
of construction, was engag·ed in a considerable 
number of activities and expended $1,040,000.00 
on items not pertaining to the construction of 
Hill Field (T. 450, 475, 1093) and according to 
the testimony of William Ellis, controller for 
Harsh Investment Corporation, no allocation of 
overhead expenses was made on the books of 
Harsh Investment Corporation (T. 1043-1044}. 
3. Th'e sum of $69,557.31 which sun1 is the ad-
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ditional amount of judgments rendered by the 
trial Court below in favor of sub-contractors and 
materialmen that was not computed in the direct 
construction costs of $2,656,457 .21. 
The trial Court properly eliminated in computing 
construction costs under the terms and conditions of the 
agreement of October 4th, 1951, the sum of $95,547.30, 
which was the amount of the profit of the Pacific Coast 
Equipment Co., another corporation totally owned and 
controlled by Schnitzer, in making purchases of ma-
terial and supplies p'ertaining to the Hill Field Air Force 
Base Housing Project. 
The trial Court properly eliminated a salary to 
Harold J. Schnitzer in the amount of $26,250.00 paid to 
him by Harsh Investment Corporation during the con-
struction of the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Pro-
ject. The agre'ement of October 4th, 1951, did not pro-
vide for inter-company profits for the benefit of Schnit-
zer or a salary for Schnitzer. 
The trial Court, in computing the judgment in favor 
of Locke did not include as a cost of construction interest 
awarded to sub-contractors and materialmen, or th'e sum 
of $25,000.00 damages allowed to Moulding Brothers 
as a result of Schnitzer's unlawful refusal to pay them 
through which they suffered damage to their credit to 
the extent of $25,000.00. 
During the cours'e of the trial, issues were presented 
to the Court and tried pursuant to certain claims of 
Locke pertaining to the California project. The trial 
Court properly found that Locke was entitled to receive 
the sum of $8,678.00 on his claim. 
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The trial Court properly found in its Finding, No. 
25 (R. 102) that the total amount of income to Harsh 
Investment Corporation was at least the sum of 
$3,339,863.49 (respondent still contends that this should 
be a greater sum, as will be discussed in his brief on 
cross appeal). 
The trial Court further properly found that the 
construction costs were in the amount of $2, 771,685.86, 
leaving a total of construction profits to be divided pur-
suant to the judgment of the trial Court in the amount 
of $568,177.63. The trial Court then allowed Schnitzer 
and/or Harsh to retain 10% of the amount of the bid 
from the above mentioned profits which was the sum 
of $276,700.00, l'eaving a sum to be divided between 
Locke and Schnitzer of $291,477.63 or a sum in favor 
of Locke of $145,738.81 plus interest of $10,201.71 to 
the 31st day of December, 1954, and in addition thereto, 
the sum of $8,678.00 plus interest of $534.21 pertaining 
to the California project, for a total gross judgment in 
favor of Locke of $165, 161.73. The trial Court allowed 
as total set-offs in favor of Schnitzer the sum of 
$16,878.97, leaving a net judgment in favor of Locke in 
the amount of $148,282.76 which was subsequently ad-
justed by the trial Court in acordance with its amend-
ment to the judgment, R182 and 183, to allow for certain 
judgment in favor of painters to the net figure of 
$14 7 ,905.00. 
Respondent contends that in the computation of the 
above mentioned judgment, the Court should have in-
cluded the contract price between Harsh Utah Corpo-
ration and Harsh Investment Corporation pertaining to 
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taining to the trial between respondent and appellants 
was terminated on June 24th, 1954, is highly improper 
and irregular. 
Contrary to the statements made by appellants in 
their brief that the trial Court was not aware of the 
amounts due sub-contractors and materialmen, respond-
ent submits that the Record will show that the trial 
Court did, on February 8th, 1955, make the following 
Order: "Plaintiff Locke asked that the judgment in 
favor of Alvin T. Locke be amended by interlineation 
by deducting one-half of the amount paid to the painters, 
or in the sum of $377.76, leaving a judgment of 
$147,905.00 for Locke. Granted." This order was en-
tered by the trial Court and was well known to app'el-
lants' counsel and an amended judgment entered pur-
suant thereto to completely adjust each and every item 
in accordance with the Court's decision. (R. 182 and 183) 
IN RE WIRING OF SCHNITZER'S HOTEL ROOM 
Inasmuch as appellants have devoted a sub-section 
in their Statement of Facts to the above entitled subject 
and have seen fit to insert it in their brief, respondent 
desires to make a few remarks pertaining thereto. 
The trial Court found that "Locke had completely 
and fully fulfilled all of the duties and obligations as 
a general construction superintendent as required under 
the terms and conditions of the agreement of October 
4th, 1951," Finding No. 12, R. 96. During the course 
of the trial and by the pleadings of appellants, they 
presented no legitimate defense to Locke's cause of 
action but attempted, as a means of defense and counter-
claim, to maliciously attack Locke with claims of em-
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bezzlen1ent and fraudulent conduct which appellants 
could not and did not support at any time during the 
trial. The Court's Findings, Pages 105 and 106 of the 
Record, read as follows : 
"The Court finds that Locke did not misappropri-
ate or convert to his own use or otherwise mis-
apply any of the monies or property so claimed 
by defendants as aforesaid to have been misap-
propriated or converted by him." 
This finding clearly establishes Locke's innocence in 
this regard and shows the malicious attack of appel-
lants during the course of the trial. 
The series of cas'es in litigation pertaining to the 
claims of respondent Locke, other sub-contractors and 
materialmen, started on trial before the Honorable 
Charles G. Cowley on May 18th, 1954. Respondent's at-
torney, John M. Sherman, was present in the Court 
room during this testimony and respondent Locke was 
also present during a large portion of the trial between 
May 18th, 1954 and June 8th, 1954, the date respond-
ent's case commeneed. During this intervening time, 
respondent was present when considerable false testi-
mony was given by appellant Schnitzer and Robert 
Kahn, assistant to Schnitzer, during the Moulding case. 
Respondent was, at this time, well aware of the mental 
attitude of appellant Schnitzer toward respondent which 
is set forth on Pages 247-M-249·-M of the transcript and 
which is summarized as follows on Page 249-M, where 
the following questions were asked by respondent's at-
torney of Schnitzer : 
"Q. Is it also a fact on that occasion between 
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Mr. Rawlings office and the Hotel Utah, you said 
Sherman, you and Locke will both rot in jail be-
fore you ever get a dime out of me on this law 
suiU 
A. I certainly did make that statement. 
Q. You do rem'ember that1 
A. I called you a blackmailer and said before 
Locke was finished there would be criminal 
charges and if you were a criminal lawyer you 
had better brush up in the law. I am not ashamed. 
You have made all typ'es of threats unethical, 
in my opinion, on all occasions. I have heard 
nothing but filthy lies from him the past two 
days." 
The conversation hereinabove recited, the Record will 
disclose, took place on April 13th, 1954, and prior to 
the trial of the case. As a result thereof, respondent and 
his attorney, John M. Sherman, knew that appellant 
Schnitzer would go to any extreme, even perjury, to 
defeat Locke's claims, and therefore 'engaged the serv-
ices of Donald H. Terry, on vacation from the Pasadena 
Police Department, to conduct an investigation so that 
the true facts and circumstances pertaining to the activ-
itres of appellant Schnitzer could be disclosed to the 
trial Court. 
Donald H. Terry's testimony regarding his investi-
gation is a part of this record, Pages 656 through 721 
and resulted in a disclosure to the trial Court that cer-
tain testimony pertaining to the preparation of official 
minutes and resolutions contained on Pages 17 of Ex. 
161 were false and fraudulent and the preparation of Ex. 
177, portions of which were dated January 15th. 1952 
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and other portions June 15th, 1953, were, in fact, pre-
pared during the course of trial between respondent and 
appellants. As a result of respondent's investigation, 
appellant Harold J. Schnitzer and one of his witnesses, 
an attorney from Portland, Oregon, Walter E. Hutchin-
son, both confessed to submitting false testimony during 
the course of this trial. Respondent submits that the 
~extreme measures taken by respondent's attorney were 
necessary so that the true facts and circumstances could 
be determined and the perjured and false testimony 
revealed to the trial Court. 
Schnitzer was so determined to defraud Locke out 
of his bonus and so determined to discredit Locke in the 
eyes of the trial Court by false claims of embezzlement, 
that Schnitzer himself was willing to run the risk of 
criminal prosecution to defeat the legitimate claims of 
Locke. 
With this background of falsified records and per-
jured testimony by Schnitzer, Respondent is concerned 
that no argument based on the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell 
& Co. audit which is in turn based on records in Schnit-
zler's possession and control, should be permitted to 
cloud a clear view of the facts proved to and found by 
the trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSTRUED THE 
AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 4th, 1951. 
A. The preponderance of the evidence shows a 
distinction between project costs and construction 
costs. 
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B. The conduct of the parties before litigation 
shows a distinction between construction costs and 
project costs. 
C. The pleadings of Locke are all prop'er. 
POINT II. 
LEGAL PRINCIPLES SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT IN ITS REJECTION OF NON-CONSTRUCT-
ION COSTS. 
POINT III. 
A PROPER AND ACCURATE ACCOUNTING 
SHOWS LOCKE IS ENTITLED TO A BONUS. 
A. The Findings of Fact of the trial Court in 
re the total receipts are conclusively supported by 
the evidence. 
B. The Findings of Fact of the trial Court in 
r'e expenditures are conclusively supported by the 
evidence. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSTRUEn THE 
F.H.A. RULES AND REGULATIONS. 
POINT V. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT SUBSTANTIATE AD-
DITIONAL FUNDS DUE LOCKE PERTAINING TO 
THE CALIFORNIA PROJECT. 
POINT VI. 
SET-OFFS DUE BY RESPONDENT LOCKE TO AP-
PELLANTS SCHNITZER AND HARSH INVEST-
MENT CORPORATION WERE PROPERLY DE-
TERMINED. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSTRUED 
THE AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 4th, 1951. 
By reason of the fact that appellants deal in specu-
lation and theory throughout their argument, respond-
ent feels that both time and space can be saved by first 
pointing out the errors in appellants' theory and argu-
ment before outlining the evidence that will substantiate 
respondent's judgment. 
Appellants, in Point I, attempt to set forth that the 
trial Court misconstrued the agreement of October 4th, 
1951, and deal with this subject from Pages 42 through 
57 of their brief. In accusing the trial Court of mis-
construing the agreement in question, appellants set 
forth a fantastic theory by which it would be necessary 
to completely disregard the express terms of the Octo-
ber 4th contract as well as certain contracts between 
Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Cor-
poration, to completely disregard F.H.A. rules and regu-
lations, the Mortgage, the Lease and other documents. 
At the outset it is seen that under the terms of th'e 
contract of October 4, 1951, drawn by Schnitzer and his 
attorneys, Locke's bonus is based on the profits earned 
"in connection with the construction" of the projects. 
The word us'ed is "construction". The parties did not, 
although they might have if they had so intended, use 
the phrase "in connection with the bidding, planning, 
financing, ownership, operation and construction." 
Any attempt to expand the meaning of the word con-
struction to embraC'e the meaning of the entire phrase 
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above suggested is manifestly absurd and contrary to the 
stated intent of the parties. 
As the word they used was "construction", it seems 
clear that the parties must have intended that in com-
puting the profits and the bonus only construction costs 
and construction income were to be considered, unless 
otherwise specifically agreed. There were two except-
ions: Schnitzer's "finance fee' of 10% of th'e bid, and 
rentals received during the construction period as a 
result of speeding up construction to completion before 
the end of the 24 months period. 
Th'e costs of bidding are obviously unrelated to 
construction; several bids were made on projects never 
constructed by the parties. 
The planning of the project by architects and engi-
neers is still not "construction," ev'en though it may be 
a necessary pre-requisite thereto, as was the cost of 
negotiating a lease for the site and the payment of 
rental thereon. 
Clearly the costs of financing, such as interest char-
ges, are not "construction," and the parties never in-
tended they should be considered as construction costs, 
for the parti'es provided a special "finance fee", or "fin-
ance service charge" to reward Schnitzer separately for 
undertaking the obligation to finance the project. This 
shows that the parties must have contemplated that 
"construction" should not embrace financing; otherwise 
it would have been unnecessary to provide specially that 
the finance fee should be charged against construction 
profits before computing the bonus. To argue, as does 
appellant, that h'e was entitled both to his finance fee 
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and to all costs of financing by way of interest, etc., is 
obviously so unreasonable that neither party would have 
contemplated it in reaching their agreement. 
Elimination of Locke's interest in the own·ership 
and operation of the project was one of the clear pur-
poses and intents of the October 4th contract. By that 
contract they intended to and did separate ownership 
from construction and it must be presumed that Schnit-
zer intended to assume the customary burdens of owner-
ship along with the privileges that went with it. That 
this is true is made quite manifest by the fact that he 
caused the "lump sum" construction contract to be exe-
cuted by which the duties incident to construction are 
clearly outlined and separated from those of ownership. 
If it had been intended that interest charges, architect's 
fees and other expenses of ownership were to be borne 
by the construction contractor, that contract would have 
so provided. 
Respondent Locke, by the terms of the October 4th, 
1951, agreement, gave up a valuable ownership interest 
in the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project and 
Great Falls, Montana, Air Force Base Housing Project, 
which have a valuation of approximately $7,000,000.00. 
The tax-free income to Locke for his ownership interests 
would have be'en in excess of $30,000.00 per year. 
After having given up these valuable assets, it is cer-
tainly not logical to believe, as appellants contend, that 
Locke intended to disregard the Construction Contract-
"Lump Sum" and the other formal documents executed 
by appellants in the computation of the bonus due him 
under the October 4th, 1951 agreement. 
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Throughout appellant's brief, they attempt to argue 
that appellant Schnitzer, Harsh Utah Corporation and 
Harsh Investment Corporation should be considered as 
a single unit and further argue the intent of the parties 
was to consider appellants as a single unit. However, 
this fantastic theory is exposed as false and without 
foundation, even by the testimony of appellant Schnit-
zer himself when he testified, Pages 53 and 54 of the 
transcript, as to the relationship between corporations, 
as follows: 
"Q. Now, Mr. Schnitzer, in transacting busi-
ness of Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh In-
vestment Corporation, you have transacted busi-
ness for both corporations, as president, have you 
noU 
A. I have. 
Q. And in your capacity as president of 
both corporations, you have directed the business 
affairs and activities of both corporations. Isn't 
that correct1 
A. I have actively directed the business 
affairs of both corporations. 
Q. And you have also acted in the same 
capacity as president and directed the activities 
of Pacific Coast Equipment Company in exactly 
the same way, have you not~ 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And is it not your custom, or was it not 
or has it not been in the past your custom and 
practice, to conduct the activities of each one of 
these corporations in a separate and distinct 
manner and directed their activities as an in-
dividual corporation as a separate entity in each 
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particular instance~ 
A. They were managed and directed by my-
self, each individually in a separate manner, each 
corporation stood on its own feet as a separate 
and distinct corporation. Their relations be-
tween one another were separate and formal. 
Q. Then you did, according to your testi-
mony, cause separate books and records of 
transactions of each individual corporation to be 
maintained separately and individually. Is that 
correct1 
A. The books of the various corporations are 
maintained separately and individually. 
Q. And if a transaction was entered into be-
tween one corporation and the other corporation, 
that transaction was reduced to writing and an 
agreement between the two corporations, was it f 
A. In many cases, depending upon the 
gravity of the situation, a formal agreement be-
tween the two corporations was prepared." 
A. THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
SHOWS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROJECT 
COSTS AND CONSTRUCTION COSTS. 
Respondent submits that the above set forth testi-
mony of appellant Schnitzer himself clearly indicates 
that Schnitzer, himself, did not regard Harsh Utah Cor-
poration and Harsh Investment Corporation as a single 
unit, but dealt with each corporation as a distinct and 
separate entity and executed contracts between the cor-
porations in a formal manner as set forth in the above 
testimony. This clearly substantiates the trial Court's 
decision in giving full force and effect to the Construct-
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ion Contract-"Lump Sum", and other formal documents 
executed between the corporations. 
The evidence, both oral and documentary, supports 
the Court's decision and finding as to a distinction be-
tween the construction costs and project costs. 
Harsh Utah Corporation as the owner-manager of 
the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project was obli-
gated to pay certain costs and expenses of the own'er 
over and above the amount of $2,995,205.00 which was 
the amount of the Construction Contract - "Lump Sum" 
due and payable to Harsh Investment Corporation. 
The Court found, in Section 17 of the Findings, R. 
98, that Harsh Utah Corporation was obligated to pay 
the following expenses over and above the amount of 
the Construction Contract - "Lump Sum" and that 
the following items should not be considered as con-
struction costs under the agreement of October 4th, 1951 
between appellants and respondent Locke: 
"(a) F.H.A. examination and inspection 
(b) Loan fees 
(c) Mortgage placement fee 
(d) Architect's compensation 
(e) F.H.A. mortgage insurance premiums 
(f) Interest on mortgage advances; 
(g) Recording fees, title examinations 
and/or insurance and legal fees". 
The testimony supporting the above stated facts on be-
half of respondent is as follows: 
1. Milton D. Goldberg, a Certified Public Account-
ant, made an audit of the books and records of Harsh 
Investment Corporation and Harsh Utah Corporation, 
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Ex .. 201, and testified that the books and records of 
Harsh Utah Corpration reflected the payment of certain 
costs of the owner corporation as set forth above (T. 
573-577). Mr. Goldberg also testified that originally the 
books and records of various Harsh companies, to wit 
Harsh Montana Corporation and Harsh Construction Co. 
were properly set up from an accounting standpoint to 
reflect the income to the construction company as an 
Account Receivable in the amount of the Construction 
Contract - "Lump Sum". These books and records 
were later changed to eliminate any Account Receivable 
item under the direction of appellant Schnitzer. (T. 549-
551). See Appendix, Pages 1 to 3. 
2. Walter E. Hutchinson, a witness produced by 
appellants and who was also secretary of Harsh Utah 
Corporation, testified that each of the above mentioned 
items were expenses properly chargeable to Harsh Utah 
Corporation; that in addition to these charges Harsh 
Utah Corporation was also obligated to pay to Harsh 
Investment Corporation the amount of the Construction 
Contract - "Lump Sum". This testimony by Walter E. 
Hutchinson, who was a witness produced by appellants 
as the F.H.A. expert and the witness who acted in the 
capacity of one of the attorneys for appellants, clearly 
establishes that there is a distinction between project 
costs to be borne by the owner-manager corporation and 
construction costs to be paid by the construction com-
pany. This testimony is set forth in the appendix in 
respondent's brief at Pages 4 to 7. 
3. William Ellis, the controller for Harsh Utah 
Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation, testi-
38 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fied that the above mentioned items were paid by Harsh 
Utah Corporation and were carried on the books of that 
corporation as a proper expense to Harsh Utah Cor-
poration. (T. 1080-1081). Mr. Ellis further testified 
that the books and records of Harsh Investment Cor-
poration did not reflect an Account Receivable Item as 
would be customary in order to prepare a profit and 
loss statement (T. 1085-1087); See Appendix Pages 8 
to 10; that the transfer of funds from Harsh Utah Cor-
poration to Harsh Investment Corporation was, from 
time to time, in the amount designated by appellant 
Schnitzer. Respondent submits that the books were not 
kept in accordance with acceptable accounting principles 
and not in accordance with the contracts as relied upon 
by Locke. (T. 534-535, 1087). 
4. W. Harold W arick, Chief Mortgage Examiner 
for F.H.A. testified that the items set forth above were 
proper costs of the owner-manager corporation, Harsh 
Utah Corporation (T. 1113-1116), and that in addition 
to those items Harsh Utah Corporation was obligated 
to pay to Harsh Investment Corporation the amount 
of the Construction Contract - "Lump Sum" (T. 1117-
1121, 1151), see Appendix, pages 11 to 15, and further 
testified, contrary to appellants' contention, that th'e 
F.H.A. in no way dictated or designated the amount of 
the Construction Contract - "Lump Sum". (T. 1115-
1116). 
5. Respondent's position is further substantiated 
in this regard by the following documentary exhibits: 
(a) Ex. 188, Financial Requirements for Closing, a 
document executed by Harsh Utah Corporation, sets 
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forth the following items: 
"8. Interest during construction $105,462 
10. Insurance during construction 4,425 
11. FHA Mortgage Insurance Premium 13,184 
12. FHA Examination fee 7,910 
13. FHA Inspection fee 13,184 
14. Financing Expense 39,552 
15. Title and Recording Expenses 2,000 
21. L'egal and organization expense 5,000" 
All of said items are in addition to Item 25 of said 
exhibit: "cash required by construction contract 
$2,995,205.00." 
(b) The Building and Loan Agreement, Ex. 64, 
Paragraph 7 on Page 2, reiterates the same items as set 
forth above as being an obligation by borrower, Harsh 
Utah Corporation. These items were in addition to the 
items covered by the Construction Contract- "Lump 
Sum" referred to in Paragraph 6, Page 2 of the Building 
and Loan Agr'eement. 
(c) Construction Contract-"Lump Sum", Ex. 61, 
which provides that Harsh Utah Corporation pay to 
Harsh Investment Corporation for actual construction 
of the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project the 
sum of $2,995,205.00 and this figure does not include 
the items set forth above which were to be paid as direct 
costs of Harsh Utah Corporation, the owner-manager 
corporation. 
In sub-paragraph (a) of Point I, appellants attempt 
to argue that the terms of the agreement show an in-
tention to consider all costs and the appellants proce·ed 
from Pages 44 through 48 to add to and interpolate into 
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this agreement their own theory which is completely and 
totally unsupported by the evidence. App'ellants set 
forth that the first paragraph of the agreement of 
October 4th, 1951 envisioned Harsh Investment Corpo-
ration being both the owner-manager corporation and 
the contractor. This interpretation is completely im-
possible under the law. It is true that the original bid 
was submitted by Harsh Investment Corporation (T. 80-
81) and as testified to by both appellant Schnitzer and 
respondent Locke (T. 786) at the time the original bid 
was submitted Harsh Investment Corporation was to 
occupy the position of sponsor and manager and the 
proposed construction company was to be the Schnitzer 
Construction Co. (T. 81). This clearly establishes the 
fact that both parties knew it was necessary to have two 
different corporations, one to own and manage and the 
other to be the contractor. 
Subsequent to the bid it was determined that the 
owner-manager corporation had to be a Utah corpo-
ration pertaining to the Hill Field project and a Montana 
corporation p'ertaining to the Great Falls Montana pro-
ject. Therefore, appellant Schnitzer caused Harsh 
Montana Corporation to be formed to own the Montana 
project and Harsh Utah Corporation to be formed to 
own the Hill Field Air Force Base Project. (T. 119). 
Appellants would have this Court b'elieve that these 
facts were known only to respondent Locke and not 
Schnitzer. 
It is exceedingly clear from the evidence, testimony 
and the contents of Ex. 228, Invitation for Proposal, 
that the requirements of separate corporations, one to 
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own the project and one to build the project, were known 
to both parties prior to entering into the October 4th, 
1951 agreement. 
At the time of entering into the contract of October 
4th, 19·51, it was also very clear by the terms of the 
agreement that the construction of the project might be 
accomplished by contracting with a totally different 
construction company in which neit:lrer Schnitzer nor 
respondent Locke had an interest. Efforts were made 
to do this with the Utah Construction Company and the 
Vitt Construction Company (T. 785) Ex. 227. The con-
tract specifically provided, in that event, that Locke 
would receive a minimum of $15,000.00 p'er project bonus 
and a maximum of $25,000.00 per project. However, 
pertaining to the Hill Field Air Force Base Project, 
subsequent to October 4th, 1951, it was decided that 
Harsh Utah Corporation would be the owner and there-
fore Harsh Utah Corporation was incorporated in De-
cember of 1951 and, in lieu of incorporating the Schnit-
zer Construction Co. to be the contractor, Harsh In-
vestment Corporation was designated to be the con-
tractor ( T. 34, 80-81, 786). The 'evidence further dis-
closes that Harsh Investment Corporation was also the 
sponsor for the Montana and California projects. How-
ever, Harsh Montana Corporation was incorporated in 
Montana to be the owner corporation. Harsh Construc-
tion Co. was incorporated in Oregon to be the contractor 
for both the Montana and California projects and Harsh 
California Corporation was incorporated in California 
to b'e the owner of the California project (T. 10, 119-120). 
On Page 47 of appellants' brief they assert the 
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argument that because Locke was to receive his bonus 
"immediately upon completion of the construction of the 
projects awarded to Harsh and receipt by Harsh of pro-
fits earned" that this language would preclude Locke 
from participating in rental income. However. appel-
lants completely disregard the language of the contract 
between Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment 
Corporation with respect to the time within whieh the 
projeet was to be built whieh was a period of twenty-
four months, Ex. 61, during whieh period rental ineome 
was reeeived. They completely disregard the fact that 
by the terms and conditions of the Construction Con-
traet-"Lump Sum", Harsh Utah Corporation was to 
pay to Harsh Investment Corporation within this 
twenty-four month period the sum of $2,995,205.00 plus 
any amounts ineurred for ehanges (T. 829). ']~here is 
nothing in this language that can b'e construed that 
Harsh Investment Corporation aetually intended to re-
eeive the money direetly from the Government unless 
Harsh Investment Corporation was eventually to be 
the owner-manager corporation instead of Harsh Utah 
Corporation. 
On Page 48 of appellants' brief, they attempt to 
argue that appellant Harold J. Sehnitzer and appellant 
Harsh Investment Corporation should be eonsidered as 
one entity and argue that it would be absurd to allow 
one party to a joint venture agreement to be required to 
pay funds from which another party to the joint venture 
agreement would benefit. However, appellants com-
pletely ignore the fact that Sehnitz'er was to reeeive 10<}'0 
of the amount of the bid beeause he was required to pro-
vide the necessary capital, whieh respondent submits 
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he failed to do, as will be discussed in r'espondent's brief 
on cross-appeal. Appellants further ignore the fact 
that Harold J. Schnitzer, through Harsh Utah Corpo-
ration and Harsh Montana Corporation and Harsh 
California Corporation acquired property valued at ap-
proximately $10,000,000.00 which was built through the 
construction ability and knowledge of respondent Locke 
and now attempt to argue that it is absurd that Locke 
should receive a bonus as a result of his efforts through 
which, according to the testimony, Schnitzer will receive 
a $100,000.00 per year tax-free income from his three 
projects. (T. 1007-1010, 1134-1136). 
Speaking of absurdittes, which appellants seem to 
indulge in freely, perhaps appellants can explain why 
Schnitzer did not insert in any agreement, nor write a 
letter to Locke, that he did not intend to be bound by the 
terms and conditions of the Construction Contract-
"Lump Sum", the terms and conditions of the Mortgage, 
the terms and conditions of the Lease, the terms and 
conditions of the Committment for Mortgage Insurance 
or the terms and conditions of the F.H.A. regulations 
insofar as his agreement with Locke was concerned. Or 
would this be too flagrant an admission on the part of 
appellant Schnitzer that he had been guilty of further 
defrauding the United States Governm'ent~ 
B. THE CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES BEFORE 
LITIGATION SHOWS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
CONSTRUCTION COSTS AND PROJECT COSTS. 
Appellants indulge in theory and speculation re-
garding the conduct of the parties before litigation in 
arguing that their conduct indicated an intent to con-
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sider all costs. Respondent submits that the intent of 
the parties can better be determined by the various con-
tracts and agreements entered into and the various 
documents executed by appellant Schnitzer on behalf of 
Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Corpo-
ration as well as the F.H.A. rules and regulations, Ex. 
3. The Financial Requirements for Closing, Ex. 188, 
clearly sets forth items to be paid by Harsh Utah Cor-
poration totalling $585,442.00 separate and apart from 
the amount of the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum" 
of $2,995,205.00. 
The Building and Loan Agreement, Ex. 64, clearly 
sets forth the items and distinguishes between construc-
tion costs and project costs, and the Construction Con-
tract-"Lump Sum", Ex. 61, makes a clear and definite 
distinction between construction costs and project costs 
and clearly indicates that the amount of th'e Construction 
Contract-"Lump Sum" was for construction only and 
did not include the additional obligations of Harsh Utah 
Corporation as owner. 
Contrary to the contentions of appellants, as will 
be discussed below, the above mentioned documents and 
agreements, many of which were executed by appellant 
Schnitzer, clearly and definitely establish the intent and 
conduct of the parties and distinguish between construc-
tion costs and project costs. 
In sub-paragraph (b) of Point I, appellants argue 
that the conduct of the parti'es was a consideration of 
all costs. Respondent admits that it was, on occasions, 
necessary to determine all of the project costs. How-
ever, the testimony is emphatically clear that there is 
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a distinction between project costs, which were paid for 
by Harsh Utah Corporation, including the Construction 
Contract-"Lump Sum", and construction costs which 
were to be paid for by the contractor, Harsh Investment 
Corporation. These facts were clearly and emphatically 
admitted by Walter E. Hutchinson, an officer of Harsh 
Utah Corporation and one of the attorneys representing 
appellants, prior to the date of the trial. ~1r. Hutchin-
son's testimony on this fact is set forth in the Appendix 
at Pages 4 to 7. 
It is true that Locke made certain mathematical 
computations pertaining to project costs and profits. 
Appellants refer to certain of these exhibits, all of which 
were prepared prior to the October 4th, 1951 agreement 
at a time when Locke was a joint venture owner and 
entitled to profits from ownership as well as construc-
tion (T. 191-M - 195-M.) In this context they are no 
proof at all as to the intent under the agreement executed 
later. Appellants further recite one instance subse-
quent to the Octob'er 4th, 1951 agreement, which was 
Ex. 223, pertaining to the Rapid City, South Dakota 
project. Respondent directs this Court's attention to 
the testimony of appellant Schnitzer wherein he admits 
that this project was not bid under an agreement with 
respondent Locke or under the terms and conditions of 
the October 4th, 1951 agreement. (T. 986). Other ex-
hibits, such as Exs. 222, 239, 241 and 226, were all pre-
pared prior to the October 4, 1951 agreement. In this 
section, appellants apparently grasp at straws to deter-
mine what the mental attitudes of the parties were at 
the time of executing the agreement of October 4th, 
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change orders in the sum of $333,952.55 instead of the 
$178,672.00, which is Point I contained in respondents' 
brief on cross appeal. Respondent further contends that 
the trial Court should not have allowed Schnitzer to re-
tain $276,700.00 out of the profits of said contract be-
cause of Schnitzer's total failure to finance under the 
provisions of the October 4th, 1951, agreement. The 
discussion of this matter is further contained in Point 
II, respondents' brief on cross appeal. 
During the course of the trial, Locke admitted being 
indebted to Schnitzer in the amount of $11,712.98 and 
admitted that in addition thereto, he was indebted to 
Schnitzer in the sum of $1,655.93. During the course 
of the trial, there was disputed testimony concerning the 
purchase of a truck load of lumber and the trial Court 
found that Locke should reimburse Schnitzer $1,200.00 
for this item. In addition to that, the Court awarded to 
Schnitzer the sum of $1,000.00 as and for attorney's fees 
pertaining to the above mentioned promissory note. 
IN RE FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL 
COURT BOTH BEFORE1 AND AFTER FORMAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW. 
Apellants submitted objections and arguments to the 
proposed Findings of Fact. Appellants also attempted 
to introduce additional evidence, one of which was a 
proposed accounting submitted by Card Greaves, CPA, 
which was rejected by the trial Court on the basis that 
all of the information was before the Court during the 
course of trial.This exhibit was Ex. 446. Now, in ap-
pellants' brief they attempt to submit additional matters, 
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which respondent submits is improper, before this Court 
in the form of the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. report 
attached to the appendix of the brief of appellants, 
Pages 19 through 35. This is similar to Ex. 446, the 
Card Greaves Report hereinabove referred to, which is 
also referred to by appellants in their brief but which 
was rejected by the trial Court. 
During the course of the trial, William Ellis, the 
controller of Harsh Investment Corporation, testified 
on several occasions. All of the books and records were 
befor'e the trial Court during the entire trial. In the 
event that appellants desired to submit any additional 
accounting evidence, they could have done so, and on 
Page 446 of the transcript, Mr. King, appellants' counsel, 
makes the following reply when asked by the Court if 
Mr. Greaves would be a witness during the trial: 
"Greaves will not be here if Goldberg testifies properly". 
Therefore, it can only be assumed that appellants did not 
desire to call Mr. Greaves as he did not appear to be a 
witness and admit that Mr. Goldberg testified properly. 
Respondent submits that all of the books and records of 
the various Harsh companies have been under the con-
trol of appellants since the date the trial closed and 
respondent has had no opportunity to know how or in 
what manner any entries were made in said books or 
for what reason and further, because Mr. Ellis testified 
during the course of the trial that the books contained 
all of the costs pertaining to the Hill Field Air Force 
Base Housing Project except the judgments rendered by 
the trial Court, that to now attempt to insert a report 
prepared under date of September 15th, 1955, as an ap-
pendix to their brief, when all of the testimony per-
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IOfi 
1951. There is absolutely nothing in the Record to sup-
port their theory and argument and yet they completely 
ignore and disregard the physical acts and conduct of 
Harold J. Schnitzer in the execution of written docu-
ments on behalf of both corporations, the acknowledge-
ment of F.H.A. rules and regulations that both corpo-
rations must be kept separate, apart, and distinct from 
each other, and formal documents as well as testimony 
of Schnitzer set forth above. 
C. THE PLElADINGS OF LOCKE ARE 
ALL PROPER. 
Sub-paragraph (c) of appellants' Point I attempts 
to assert that the pleadings show a theory considering 
all costs and argue on this point on Pages 54 through 57. 
Respondent submits that the pleadings themselves 
clearly assert a cause of action by respondent Locke 
against Harold J. Schnitzer individually, Harsh Invest-
ment Corporation and Harsh Utah Corporation and it 
is true that Locke has rep'eatedly made claims of all ap-
pellants. However, there is nothing in the pleadings or 
in the record that substantiates appellants' contention 
that all of the appellants were to be considered in any 
different capacity than the Record itself discloses them 
to actually be. Appellants assert that all appellants 
must be considered together as one unit in order for 
Locke to receive any sum whatsoever as a bonus from 
the profits. This fact is absolutely untrue and is not 
substantiated in any way by the evidence. Th'e account-
ing will specifically show the amount Harsh Utah Cor-
poration was obligated to pay to Harsh Investment 
Corporation to construct the project. It will specific-
aly show the amount that Harsh Utah Corporation was 
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to pay to Harsh Investment Corporation for extras and 
will specifically show the amount of rental incom'e r~­
ceived during the construction period and from said 
funds the amount which Locke should receive for a 
bonus. These items will be discussed in more detail 
later in this br~ef and in respondent's brief on cross 
appeal. 
The fact that repeated references were made to 
Harsh Utah Corporation, Harsh Investment Corporation 
and Harold J. Schnitzer throughout respondent Locke's 
complaint was necessitated by the fact that Locke had 
absolutely no knowledge as to where the money had 
gone that was received from the Irving Trust Co. and 
the funds required by the Government to be placed in 
escrow. The evidence will clearly show that these funds 
were indiscriminately and improperly withdrawn by 
Harold J. Scnitzer in violation of th'e contracts and 
agreements and in order to properly trace these funds 
from various corporations to the other and eventually 
into the pocket of Harold J. Schnitzer, it was necessary 
to use the terminology used by respondent Locke in his 
complaint in intervention. 
Insofar as Locke is concerned, the evidence and testi-
mony is complete that he considered the various corpo-
rations distinct and separate 'entities and that he relied 
upon the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum" and other 
formal documents executed (T. 184-M, 784-786, 794-796). 
See appendix Pages 40, 41. Respondent submits that 
the Court properly distinguished betwe'en construction 
costs and project costs and the amounts to be paid by 
Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Corpo-
ration. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is exceedingly clear from the evidence herein-
above set forth, both from oral testimony and from doc-
umentary evidence introduced, that there was a distinct 
division between the obligations of Harsh Utah Corpo-
ration and Harsh Investment Corporation, which un-
equivocably supports the lower Court's Findings of Fact 
and in particular Finding No. 17, R. 98, which is as 
follows: 
"In computing the profits to be divided pursuant 
to the contract, Exhibit "A" [the agreement of 
October 4th, 1951] distinction must be made be-
twe'en construction costs and project costs. Pro-
ject costs include certain expenses of Harsh Utah 
Corporation as the owner-management corpora-
tion, consisting of the following items: 
(a) F.H.A. examination and inspection; 
(b) Loan fees; 
(c) Mortgage placement f·ee; 
(d) Architect's compensation; 
(e) F.H.A. mortgage insurance premiums; 
(f) Interest on mortgage advances ; 
(g) Recording fees, title examinations and/or 
insurance and legal fees, 
said items being in the total amount of One 
Hundred Fifty-seven Thousand Four Hundred 
Forty Two and 76/100 dollars ($157,442.76). This 
expense is not a cost of construction and is not 
chargeable as an expense of Harsh Investment 
Corporation in computing th'e construction profit 
to be divided between the parties to the contract 
Exhibit "A"." [The October 4th, 1951 agree-
ment.] 
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Respondent further submits that the testimony and 
documents h'ereinabove referred to supports respond-
ent's position and the audit of Milton D. Goldberg, Ex. 
201, in eliminating these expenses of Harsh Utah Cor-
poration as not properly being chargeable to the con-
struction contract under the terms of the agreen1ent of 
October 4th, 1951 between the parties. 
POINT II. 
LEGAL PRINCIPLES SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT IN ITS REJEiCTION OF NON-
CONSTRUCTION COSTS. 
Respondent has no argument with the legal prin-
ciples declared in cases cited in appellants' brief per-
taining to legal principles, Point II. However, respond-
ent does not agree in any manner with the argument 
of appellants attempting to apply those principles in as-
certaining the intent of the parties at the time of enter-
ing into the agreement of October 4th, 1951. The actual 
intent of the parties can best be determined by their 
previous agreements and conduct. By the terms of Exs. 
157 and 158, Locke had a joint venture interest in the 
construction and the ownership of certain Wherry 
Housing Projects. He was induced by appellant Schnit-
zer's fals'e and fraudulent representations to part with 
this ownership interest so that Schnitzer could finance 
the project by selling stock in the ownership corpora-
tion, which Schnitzer did not do (T. 32-M, 33-M, 41-M; 
77-79). Under the agreement of October 4th, 1951, Locke 
was divested of his ownership interest in the Wherry 
Housing Projects at Great Falls, Montana and the Hill 
Field Air Force Base, having a replacement value of 
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[. 
some $7,000,000.00. Locke's income as a one-half owner 
of these projects would have b'een in excess of $30,000.00 
per year over the period of the lease, 75 years. (T. 1007-
1010; 1134-1136). With a background of these very ap-
parent facts, it is impossible to understand app'ellants' 
contentions as to the theoretical intentions of the parties. 
To follow appellants' theory it would be necessary 
to contend, ridiculously, that the United States Govern-
ment, through F.H.A., was to provide all of the fnnds 
necessary to build the Hill Field Air Force Base Hous-
ing Project and then allow Harold J. Schnitzer to own 
it and collect rents for his own benefit for a period of 
75 years and yet never to have invested any funds what-
soever in said project. For appellants to argue that 
the only funds available were mortgage funds is in com-
plete violation of the F.H.A. rules and regulations as 
contained in Ex. 3, the Commitment for :Mortgage In-
surance, Ex. 186, the Mortgage, Ex. 63 and the Con-
struction Contract-"Lump Sum", Ex. 61, and the agree-
ment of October 4th, 1951 with Locke. 
Respondent submits that in the initial instance, in 
order to have a profit, in connection with the "construc-
tion" of the project, under any conceivable definition of 
the word, there must first b'e income and secondly, ex-
penses, in connection with such construction, and how 
and in what manner appellants can continually attempt 
to establish an argument showing the intention of the 
parties that the mortgage proceeds were to be considered 
as construction income, when in every conceivable def-
inition and from the evidence, both oral and documen-
tary, the mortgage proceeds are definitely offset by the 
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equal mortgage liability, is impossible to understand. 
The uncontroverted evidenc'e submitted during the 
course of the trial is, both from the testimony of Mr. 
Goldberg, (T. 571-572), see Appendix Page 42, and Mr. 
Ellis, (T. 1085-1086), to the effect that mortgage pro-
ceeds are not income, and the receipt thereof creates a 
liability on the mortgage note. 
To argue that respondent Locke, at any time, in-
tended to bind himself to the theory set forth in appel-
lants' brief is without merit or justification in any 
manner whatso'ever. There is absolutely no conceivable 
method in the world of providing any income for the 
construction under the terms and conditions of the agree-
ment of October 4, 1951 between the parties or in any 
other mann'er whatsoever unless the amount of the Con-
struction Contract-"Lump Sum" plus the change order 
extras are to be considered the established income of 
the construction company. The evidence clearly and 
unequivocably !establishes this to be a fact and this to 
be the true intent of the parties (T. 781, 990-992). The 
evidence further discloses that the original books were 
set up on proper accounting principles showing the con-
tract amount as an account receivable to the construc-
tion company and were subsequently altered under the 
direction of Harold J. Schnitzer. (T. 550-551, 534-535). 
By using th'e phrase "profits earned . . . in con-
nection with the construction" of the project, the parties 
made manifest their intention to separate construction 
profits from overall project profits, and construction 
costs from project costs. 
The situation and background of the parties, con-
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sidered in the light of the authorities cited by appellant, 
fortifies rather than weakens the conclusion of the trial 
court that the contract of the parties intended to and did 
require a distinction between construction costs and pro-
ject costs. 
The facts (1) that Locke was the construction ex-
pert, (2) that Locke by the contract surrendered all own-
ership in and control over the proj'ect, as distinguished 
from construction, (3) that Schnitzer was to be paid a 
special fee of $276,700 for financing the project, and 
hence was expected to bear all the costs of financing, ( 4) 
the knowledge poss'essed by all parties that an owner-
manager corporation separate from the constructing 
corporation would, under F.H.A. rules, have to be 
organized, ( 5) the acts of Schnitzer in setting up a 
"lump-sum construction contract between his corpora-
tions, without requiring therein the contractor to pay 
non-construction project costs, and (6) in originally 
causing the lump-sum contract price to be set up on 
Harsh books as an account receivable, all argue that, 
except as specifically provided on the fiance fee, only 
construction costs were intended to be considered. 
The conclusion reached by the trial court is ob-
viously sound in fact and law, and should be affirmed on 
this point. 
POINT III 
A PROPER AND ACCURATE ACCOUNTING 
SHOWS LOCKE! IS ENTITLED TO A BONUS 
A. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT IN RE THE TOTAL RECEIPTS 
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ARE CONCLUSIVELY SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE. 
The trial Court properly and accurately determined 
the amount of income with the exception of th·e amount 
of change order extras (see Point I, respondent's brief 
on cross appeal). The following is a summary of the 
testimony and evidence p'ertaining to the income during 
the construction period: 
1. The Construction Contract-"Lump Sum" be-
tween Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment 
Corporation in the amount of $2,995,205.00, Ex. 61. This 
is the figure used by Mr. Goldberg in his audit, Ex. 201, 
as part of the gross income to Harsh Investment Cor-
poration. (T. 571-572). See appendix, Page 42. Mr. 
Goldberg testified that he obtained this figure from the 
contract which was presented to him after some little 
argument by appellant Schnitzer. (T. 533-535). 
(a) During the trial Ex. 182 was introduced which 
was an affidavit submitted by Harold J. Schnitzer claim-
ing that there was a loss on the Montana and Utah 
Projects. In support thereof, Mr. Schnitzer attached 
Exs. A and B repr'esenting that these were audits made 
by Card Greaves, a Certified Public Accountant of Port-
land, Oregon, employed as the accountant and auditor 
for the Harsh Companies. Mr. Goldberg testified per-
taining to the Card Greaves r'eports, that they were not, 
under acceptable accounting procedures, in any way a 
profit and loss statement; that the Card Greaves reporb 
attached to Ex. 182 were only itemizations of costs. Mr. 
Goldberg further testified that in conversations witt 
Mr. Greaves in Portland, Oregon, at the time he wa~ 
making the audit, Mr. Greaves acknowledged that thE 
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reports attached to Ex. 182 did not purport to be profit 
and loss statements. Mr. Greaves further acknowledged 
that he had never, at any time, had access to the con-
tracts between the owning corporations and the con-
tracting corporations to determine what the amount of 
the income to th'e construction company should have 
been. ~Ir. Goldberg's testimony pertaining to Ex. 182 
and his conversations with Mr. Greaves is contained at 
T. 465-473; 588-591. His testimony under cross examina-
tion by Mr. King pertaining to the fact that Mr. Greaves 
did not represent his reports to be profit and loss state-
ments and that he had not had access to the amount of 
the income to the contracting corporations is set forth 
in the appendix at Page 43. 
(b) The testimony of Walter E. Hutchinson, the 
F.H.A. attorney for appellant Schnitzer and S'ecretary 
of Harsh Utah Corporation, was that this was a con-
tract entered into between the owner-manager corpora-
tion, Harsh Utah Corporation, and the contractor, Harsh 
Investment Corporation, (T. 829), and that the F.H.A. 
in no way dictated the amount of this contract. Mr. 
Hutchinson's testimony in this respect is set forth in 
the appendix at Pages 5 to 7. 
(c) Respondent directs this Court's attention to 
Article III of Construction Contract-"Lump Sum", Ex. 
61, which reads as follows : 
"Article III - The Contract Sum. The owner 
shall pay the contractor for the performance of 
the contract, subject to additions and deductions 
provided herein, on account of construction, the 
sum of $2,995,205.00 cash". 
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This terminology clearly supports respondent's position 
that this amount was to be paid for construction only. 
(d) W. Harold Warwick, Chief Mortgage Examiner 
for F.H.A., testifted that the F.H.A. did not in any way 
dictate to either the owner-manager corporation or the 
contracting corporation the amount of the Construction 
Contract-"Lump Sum" (T. 1116). Appellants through-
out their entire brief contend that the only funds avail-
able for the construction of tlre project were receipts 
from mortgage funds. This theory is completley erron-
eous, and the testimony of Mr. Warwick, in this respect, 
setting forth that at the time the original project was 
started the total funds availabl'e for the entire project, 
is as follows : 
"A total of the mortgage loan, $2,636,800.00, plus 
$651,690.00, or a total of $3,288,490.00" 
which Mr. King himself. computed as set forth on Page 
1115 of the transcript. This figure did not include the 
change order extras which were subsequently testified 
to by Mr. Warwick and which will be set forth herein-
after in this brief. 
2. Change Order extras were additional contracts 
between Harsh Utah Corporation as the owner and 
Harsh Investment Corporation as contractor for the 
performance of additional work over and above tlle 
original plans and specifications pertaining to Hill Field 
Air Force Base Housing Project, Ex. 1. 
(a) By the terms and conditions of the Construction 
Contract-"Lump Sum," Ex. 61, the contractor is en-
titled to extras for change orders in accordanC'e with the 
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specifications, Ex. 1. Article XV of said specifications, 
Ex. 1, reads as follows : 
"Article XV. Changes in Work .... Owner, with-
out invalidating the contract, may order extra 
work, or make changes by altering, adding to or 
deducting from the work, the contract sum b'eing 
adjusted accordingly .... the value of any such 
extra work or change shall be determined in one 
or more of the following ways : 
(a) By estimate and acceptance in a lump sum 
(b) By unit price named in the contract or subse-
quently agreed upon 
(c) By cost and percentage or by cost and a fixed 
fee". 
The testimony is to the effect that the procedure fol-
lowed by Harsh Utah Corporation as owner and Harsh 
Investment Corporation as contractor was in accordance 
with Sub-section (a) above, by estimate and acceptance 
in a lump sum. (T. 829). See Appendix Page 16. 
(b) Respondent directs this Court's attention to the 
language of the change orders which ar'e Exs. 164 and 
196 and are further identified as F.H.A. Form No. 2437, 
which is as follows : 
"Contractor, Mortgagor and mortgagee indi-
cate by signing this r'equest: It is the expressed 
intention to execute the changes described herein; 
it is understood that F.H.A. acceptance will be 
determined without regard to cost and in no way 
implies acceptance of or concurrence with mort-
gagor's statement of cost; it is understood that 
when F.H.A. has 'estimated and summarized the 
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costs of all accepted changes and the net effect 
thereof is a decrease in the total construction 
cost, the insurable mortgage amount may be 
similarly decreas'ed, but if the net effect is an in-
crease above the mortgage amount the additional 
costs will be defrayed by the mortgagor". 
Respondent submits that this is a binding contract 
between the mortgagor, Harsh Utah Corporation, and 
the contractor, Harsh Investment Corporation, each and 
every change order being signed by both corporations. 
(c) The testimony of Arthur Izakson, of the F.H.A., 
is to the effect that the only function of F.H.A. in re-
gard to change orders is not pertaining to the dollar 
amount b'etween owner and contractor but pertains only 
to approval of the change to be made insofar as F.H.A. 
is concerned, and to act in an advisory capacity insofar 
as the mortgagee is concerned to determine the insur-
able value of any increase in the mortgage. (T. 279-282, 
435-437). Appendix 30-32. 
(d) The testimony of W. Harold Warwick is to 
the effect that if there was no other written agreement 
between Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment 
Corporation, the language of the change orders them-
selves as mortgagor and mortgagee would be a binding 
contract between the two. (T. 1123-1125). Appen. 27-29. 
(e) Appellant Harold J. Scnitz'er admits in his 
testimony that Harsh Investment Corporation was en-
titled to receive additional funds from Harsh Utah Cor-
poration but during his testimony limits the amount of 
these funds to the amount of the mortgage increase 
rather than th'e amount of the actual change orders 
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executed between Harsh Utah Corporation as owner and 
Harsh Investment Corporation as contractor (T. 100-
101). 
Respondent's position in this matter will be dis-
cussed in more detail in his brief on cross appeal, Point 
I thereof. 
(f) Respondent Locke's testimony, which is clearly 
supported by the above set forth testimony and record, 
clearly establishes that change order extras were in-
come to the contractor, Harsh Investment Corporation. 
(T. 795-796). 
(g) The trial Court, in determining the amount of 
change order extras in its Finding of Fact, established 
the amount of the additional income to Harsh Investment 
Corporation in the sum of $178,672.00, R. 99, Paragraph 
20, Sub-paragraph (b). This figure was taken directly 
from the testimony during th'e time of trial, that Harsh 
Utah Corpporation, as mortgagor, would receive this 
amount in increased mortgage funds. Respondent's 
position, as will be set forth in his brief on cross appeal, 
is that it should have been the sum of $333,952.55 in ac-
cordance with the change orders submitted between 
Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Corpo-
ration, irrespective of the amount by which the mort-
gage would be increased. 
(h) Arthur Izakson, inspector for the F.H.A., testi-
fied that pertaining to change orders No. 1 through No. 
79, 'exclusive of No. 77, that the F.H.A. had approved a 
mortgage increase in the amount of $169,576.00 (r_t\ 302-
303) and further testified that, pursuant to stipulation 
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and testimony, the recommendation for mortgage in-
crease pertaining to change order No. 77, was in the 
amount of $9,096.00 (T. 435). These two amounts total 
the amount used by the trial Court of $178,672.00. This 
is the only amount before the trial Court pertaining to 
the mortgage increase approved by F.H.A. Mr. Izakson 
also testified that the amount that Harsh Utah Corpo-
ration, as owner, represented that it would pay to Harsh 
Investment Corporation, as contractor, for these change 
orders was in the total amount of $333,952.55 (T. 298-
303; 434-435). See appendix, Pages 30 to 32. 
(i) Respondent desires to direct the Court's at-
tention to the Goldberg audit, Ex. 201, in which the 
figure of $169,000.00 was used, th'e testimony in this 
regard being that this figure was supplied to Mr. Gold-
berg by appellant Schnitzer at the time the audit was 
made in Portland, Oregon, and without regard to any 
judicial determination of the contractual effect of said 
change orders. ( T. 535-537). 
3. The net amount of rental income received from 
the lease of Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project 
during the construction period was in the amount of 
$165,986.49, R. 99. 
(a) Harsh Investment Corporation as the contrac-
tor had a p'eriod of twenty-four months within which 
to construct the project which period ran from the month 
of July, 1952, the date of executing the mortgage and 
Construction Contract - "Lump Sum", through the 
month of June, 1954 ( T. 114, 115). This period of time 
is further substantiated by the following documents and 
exhibits: The Mortgage, EiX. 63, the Construction Con-
60 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tract-"Lump Sum", Ex. 61, and the Commitment for 
Mortgage Insurance, Ex. 186. 
(b) Respondent Locke testified that there was an 
agreement between himself and appellant Schnitzer to 
the effect that the income from rentals during the above 
mentioned twenty-four month period of construction 
would be included in computing Locke's interest under 
the contract of October 4th, 1951 (T. 42-M - 45-M, 797). 
(c) During the course of trial certain documentary 
evidence was introduced to support respondent's position 
that the rental income during the construction period 
should be taken into consideration in computing the 
amount of bonus due Locke. Appellant Schnitzer testi-
fied that the relationship between the owner-manager 
corporations in Montana, Utah and California, and the 
Construction Companies being Marsh Construction Co. 
in Montana and California and Harsh Investment Cor-
poration in Utah, was the same (T. 119, 120). The evi-
danc'e will further show that appellant Harold J. Schnit-
zer admitted that rental income during the above men-
tioned construction period was taken into consideration 
in making the original bid and that this income during 
the construction period had been calculated to derfay 
certain costs. Docum'ents submitted by respondent to 
substanticate this fact during the course of the trial were 
certain letters written by the vairous Harsh companies 
and signed by Harold J. Schnitzer, Exs. 181, 184, 185, 
231 and 233. 
(d) Respondent Locke testified that during the 
course of construction a considerable amount of over-
time was spent by Harsh Investment Corporation in an 
effort to obtain early occupancy by tenants of Hill Field 
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Air Force Base Housing Project so that the rental in-
come could start at the earliest possible mom·ent. (T. 
795 ). See Appendix 40-41. The expenditure of this 
overtime was also verified by appellant Schnitzer (T. 
916, 996). 
(e) The amount of the rental income as set forth 
by the trial Court in its findings, R. 99, 100 and 101, is 
supported by the record as follows : The gross rental 
income for the period of July 1st, 1953 to March 31st, 
1954 is in the amount of $163,235.83, Ex. 203. The rental 
income from the period of April 1st, 1954 to June 30th, 
1954 is in the amount of $84,795.81 which figure is taken 
from the 1exhibit admitted into evidence by stipulation 
and submitted by appellant, Harsh Utah Corporation, 
Ex. 442, making a total gross income of $248,031.64. The 
operating expenses for the above mentioned period are 
shown on Pages 100 and 101 of the Record and are taken 
from Exs. 203 and 442. However, the trial Court prop-
erly deducted certain amounts, such as management fees 
paid directly to appellant, Harold J. Schnitzer, and pro-
rated insurance premiums, allowing a total, net oper-
ating expense for the construction p'eriod of $82,045.15, 
which amount deducted from the total income set forth 
above properly establishes the net rental income for the 
construction period in tlte amount of $165,986.49. The 
Court properly disallowed interest on mortgage advance-
ments as not being a proper deduction under the terms 
and conditions of the October 4th, 1951 agreement. 
App'ellants, in Point III of their brief, sub-para-
graph (a) thereof, contend that the total receipts of the 
project were improperly and inaccurately calculated. 
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Under this section appellants argue that Schnitzer, as 
president of Harsh Utah Corporation, signed the Con-
struction Contract-"Lump Sum' to pay to Harsh In-
vestment Corporation the sum of $2,995,205.00 and that 
Harsh Utah Corporation obtained a contract from the 
Government to act as owner-manager of this project 
and to receive all of the rental income therefrom, but 
that Harold J. Schnitz'er, as president of Harsh Utah 
Corporation, did not intend to carry out the terms and 
conditions of these agreements which were the funda-
mental basis and inducement for the United States 
Government to designate and accept Harsh Utah Cor-
poration as the owner-manager of the Hill Field Air 
Force Base Housing Project. 
In this section, appellants again completely ignore 
the testimony of their own witnesses, which was sup-
ported by the testimony of W. Harold Warwick, pertain-
ing to the determination of the Construction Contract 
- " Lump Sum". Respondent submits that this testi-
mony clearly confirms the judgment of the trial Court 
in differentiating between project costs and construction 
costs and in establishing the Construction Contract -
"Lump Sum" to be a portion of the income to the con-
struction company. The testimony regarding these facts 
is set forth in the appendix to respondent's brief at Page 
4 to 7; 22. 
On Page 73 of their brief, appellants argue that the 
amount of the original bid submitted was less than the 
amount of the Construction Contract - "Lump Sum" 
and again argue as to the total amount of the proceeds 
received, referring to Ex. 443 which exhibit was not ad-
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mitted in evidenc'e by the Court. Appellants apparently 
ignore the requirements of the Commitment for Mort-
gage Insurance pertaining to the bid which required 
considerable extra cash over and above the amount of 
the bid and in excess of the amount of the mortgage as 
a condition of awarding the project itself to the Harsh 
Utah Corporation. The testimony emphatically states 
that the amount of the Construction Contract - "Lump 
Sum" was determined after considering all of the factors 
and was not dictated to by F.H.A. but in the event that 
the Construction Contract - "Lump Sum" was lowered 
the effect would be that Schnitzer would have to invest 
more money in Harsh Utah Corporation which appar-
ently he did not desire to do (T. 341-342, 1115-1116, 
1123-1124). See Appendix P. 4-7; 22; 27-29. 
At the bottom of Page 73 and the top of Page 74 
of their brief, appellants further make reference to 
Ex. 443 which was not admitted into evidence and is not 
a part of tlre Record of the trial Court. 
On Page 74, appellants further set forth portions 
of the October 4th, 1951 agreement between respondent 
and appellants. However, respondent submits that thes'e 
provisions did not come into effect in the construction 
of the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project and 
were to only be considered between the parties in the 
event that some third party, such as Utah Construction 
Company, performed the entire construction contract. 
(T. 185). 
It is submitted that the accountings admitted by 
the Court below were 'entirely proper and supported by 
the evidence with the exception of change order extras 
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as will be discussed in respondent's brief on cross appeal. 
App'ellants argue that certain interest payments, 
totalling $105,845.39, were bonafide construction expen-
ses of Harsh Utah Corporation during the construction 
period. This is not a true and correct statement of fact 
and is not supported by the books and records of Harsh 
Utah Corporation itself. Appellant Schnitzer testified 
on Page 124 of the transcript, as follows: 
By 1\:fr. Sherman: 
"Q. Interest and depreciation, those items 
having been eliminated from the books and rec-
ords of Harsh Utah Corporation, as they stood 
on March 31, 1954 ~ 
A. I do not think the Harsh Utah Corpor-
ation books have ever shown interest payments." 
The trial Court properly found, under the terms of 
the contract of October 4th, 1951 that the net rental 
income should be added to the income of Harsh Invest-
ment Corporation to offset substantial payments of 
over time expended for the purpose of obtaining early 
rental income. In considering the amount of net rental 
income so far as the agreement of October 4th, 1951 is 
concerned, the Court properly eliminated interest and 
depreciation. App'ellant Schnitzer testified during the 
course of the trial that the net rental income received 
during the 24-months' construction period was calcu-
lated as income in submitting the original bid . (T. 120, 
121). 
Again, in the conclusion on the argum'ents pertain-
ing to receipts, appellants attempt to include all cor-
porations and Harold J. Schnitzer as a single unit and 
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completely disregard the contractual obligations en-
tered into by said corporations and by Harold J. Schnit-
zer individually. 
In this connection it should be observed that under 
familiar equitable principles the corporate fiction or 
entity will be disregarded whenever necessary to pre-
vent the perpetration of a fraud, but will never be 
disregarded where to do so would aid a cheat to defraud 
his intended victim. Hence the trial court very properly 
refused to allow Schnitzer to drain off the construc-
tion profits through the medium of his alter ego, Pacific 
Coast Equipment Co., but insisted that the construction 
profit be computed on the basis of the construction con-
tract between Harsh Investment Corporation and Harsh 
Utah Corporation as separate entities with separate 
functions. 
Western Securittes Co. v. Spiro, 62 Utah 623, 
221 Pac. 856 ; 
Geary v. Cain 
79 Utah 268, 9 Pac. 2d 396; 
Salina Canyon Coal Co. v. Klemm 
76 Utah 372, 290 Pac. 161 
(Syllabus No. 24) 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that the trial Court 
properly determined that the Construction Contract -
"Lump Sum" was, as established by the eviednce and 
record, a proper income item to Harsh Investment Cor-
poration as the contractor. This fact was established 
under cross examination of appellants' own witnesses, 
to wit, their controller, William Ellis, the secretary of 
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tlte Harsh Utah Corporation and its F.H.A. attorney 
Walter E. Hutchinson, by the testimony of W. Harold 
Warwick, the F.H.A. authority, and by a preponderance 
of all other testimony on this subject together with the 
documentary evidence supporting same 
The trial Court determined that the amount of 
change order extras to be in the amount of the mort-
gage increase of $178,672.00, as supported by the record. 
However, respondent still contends that the trial Court 
should have computed the amount, not on the basis of 
increase in mortgage, but on the basis of the change 
orders executed between the owner and the contractor, 
in the sum of $333,952.55 as will be set forth in respond-
dent's brief on cross appeal. · 
The trial Court properly determined, from a pre-
ponderance of evidence, the correct amount of rental 
income to be considered under the terms and conditions 
of the October 4th, 1951 agreement in the total amount 
of $165,986.49. This amount is supported by the gr'eat 
weight of testimony and documentary evidence and there 
is absolutely no evidence of any merit whatsoever in 
the record of the trial Court that this figure should not 
properly be included under the terms and conditions of 
the agreement of October 4th, 1951 between the respon-
dent and app'ellants. 
B. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT IN REi EXPENDITURES ARE 
CONCLUSIVELY SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE. 
The trial Court in its Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law properly and accurately determined the 
amount of expenses. 
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1. The Trial Court, in accordance with the testi. 
mony and evidence offered during the course of thE 
trial, prop'erly and accurately determined the amount 
of construction costs in three categories: 
(a) Direct construction costs 
(b) Indirect construction costs 
(c) An adjustment in accordance with the 
amount of judgments rendered by the trial Court 
to other litigants in this action. 
2. The direct construction costs were determined by 
the trial Court to be in the amount of $2,656,457.21. 
This is the amount testified to by Milton D. Goldberg, 
Certified Public Accountant, who audited the books and 
records of Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Invest-
ment Corporation pertaining to tire Hill Field Air Force 
Base Housing Project and is contained on the last page 
of Ex. 201. 
(a) The direct construction costs a hove mentioned 
eliminated inter-company profits between Pacific Coast 
Equipment Co. owned, operated and controlled by appel-
lant Schnitzer, on merchandise purchased by Pacific 
Coast Equipment Co. and sold to Harsh Investment Cor-
poration. The terms and conditions of the October 4th, 
1951 contract between respondent and appellants did 
not provide for any inter-company profits in favor of 
appellant Schnitzer or any of his corporations. This 
point is apparently conceded by appellants since they 
made certain inter-company adjustments between Pacific 
Coast Equipment Co. and Harsh Investment Corpor-
ation by preparing an agreement to do same during the 
course of the trial and dating it back. Said agreement 
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is Ex. 177. The controller for the Harsh companies, 
William Ellis, testified that the adjustment p'ertaining 
to Ex. 177 only left sufficient profit in the Pacific Coast 
Equipment Co. to pay the salary of Harold J. Schnitzer. 
(T. 1099-1101). Respondent submits that the entire 
transactions between Pacific Coast Equipment Co. and 
Harsh Investment Corporation pertaining to Hill Field 
Air Force Base Housing Project should be 'eliminated 
and that Harold J. Schnitzer should not be permitted to 
receive funds as a salary, either from Harsh Investment 
and/or Pacific Coast Equipment Co., under the terms 
and conditions of the October 4th, 1951 agreement. 
(b) The elimination in Ex. 201 of the items to be 
charged and paid by Harsh Utah Corporation has been 
discussed by respondent under Point II of this brief and 
will not be discussed further here. 
(c) The testimony of William Ellis, the controller 
of Harsh Investment Corporation was to the effect that 
the Card Greaves report submitted by appellants as 
Ex. 182 and the Goldberg audit, Ex. 201 were, in his 
opinion as controller for tlre Harsh companies, in sub-
stantial agreement insofar as construction costs were 
concerned (T. 1039). 
3. The trial Court, by its Findings of Fact, R. 101, 
determined that the amount of the indirect construction 
costs, which was general overhead, of Harsh Investm'ent 
Corporation should be in the amount of $45,631.34. 
(a) This amount is fair and reasonable between the 
parties inasmuch as it was the amount of general over-
head pertaining to th'e Great Falls Montana Air Force 
Base Housing Project, which involved a larger number 
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of units, to wit, 400 units, and the expenditure of large 
sums of money than did the 350 units at Hill Fiel1 
Air Force Base Housing Project. 
(b) The evidence and record clearly discloses, a: 
does the testimony of appellants' witness, William Ellis 
that Harsh Investment Corporation, during the perio< 
of time that it was engaged in the construction of Hil 
Field Air Force Base Housing Project, was also ·engagec 
in other business activities (T. 450, 475, 1093). EHis fur 
ther testified that there had been no direct allocatior 
of overhead expens'e between these various business en. 
terprises (T. 1043, 1044). Ellis further testified tha1 
during the course of construction of Hill Field Air Form 
Base Housing Project, Harsh Investment Corporatior 
expended the sum of $1,040,505.00 on business activitie~ 
other than Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Projec1 
(T. 475). 
(c) Respondent submits that appellants should havE 
or could have segregated overhead expens'es pertaining 
to Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project but did 
not, at any time, attempt to do so. The books and rec-
ords were under the control of appellants at all times. 
It would be inequitable and unfair to charge the full 
amount of overhead on the books and records of Hars~ 
Investment Corporation in an accounting pertaining tc 
respondent Locke's interest in the contract of Octobe1 
4th, 1951, and thus penaliz'e Locke for Schnitzer's failurE 
to keep proper books and make proper apportionments. 
4. The trial Court, in determining the additiona: 
amount of construction costs, pursuant to the judgmenh 
rendered in the litigation before the trial Court, proper!~ 
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and accurately computed the amount as $69,597.31. 
(a) According to the testimony of Milton D. Gold-
berg, which was corroborated by William Ellis, the sum 
of $176,781.27 was carried on the books and records of 
Harsh Investm'ent Corporation at the time of the Gold-
berg audit and was included in the total sum of direct 
construction costs of $2,656,457.21. 
(b) In computing the additional amounts awarded 
by the trial Court, the total judgments computed 
by the trial Court, exclusive of penalties and interest, 
were as follows : 
Gresham Roofing Co. ______________________________ $ 16,807.72 
Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co.________ 35,296.90 
Vitt Construction ------------------------------------ 129,191.22 
Moulding Brothers ---------------------------------- 36,083.34 
Waterfall Construction Co. ------------------ 22,500.00 
Utah Fire Clay Co. ---------------------------------- 6,499.40 
being a total of ----------------------------------------$246,378.58 
From this amount was deducted the amount of $176,781.-
27, which established that the additional amount of con-
struction costs, taking into consideration the judgments 
awarded by the Court below, was in th'e amount of 
$69,597.31 over and above direct construction costs pre-
viously computed, which was the figure used by the 
trial Court, R. 101 and 102. 
(c) The trial Court properly eliminated interest and 
costs and the sum of $25,000.00 damages allowed to 
Moulding Brothers for damages to their credit upon 
the basis that these items were items not directly in-
volved in construction costs but were caused by appel-
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lants' failure to pay sub-contractors the a1nounts dm 
and owing to them at the time they were due and owing. 
(d) In addition to the above, adjustment was sub-
sequently made on February 8th, 1955 at the request of 
respondent, taking into consideration the payment of 
funds to certain painters, not calculated by the tria] 
Court or respondent at the time of the signing of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Said amount 
paid to Haycock, et al, was in the amount of $755.52; 
one-half of that sum, to wit, $377.76 was deducted from 
the judgment rendered by the trial Court, as is disclosed 
on Pages 182 and 183 of the Record, "Amendment to 
Judgment". 
(e) Respondent further submits that the Record 
discloses that appellants effected substantial discounts 
in S1ettlements of judgments with certain litigants and 
respondent has not been credited for any portion thereof. 
(f) Respondent submits that the trial Court properly 
determined the total income to Harsh Investment Cor-
poration, as set forth in its Findings at R. 192, to be at 
least in the amount of $3,339,963.43 and further properly 
determined the total amount of construction costs to be 
in the amount of $2, 771,685.86, leaving a total construct-
ion profit to be divided pursuant to the judgment of 
the trial Court, in the amount of $568,177.63. 
Respondent still contends an additional amount of 
income should be computed under the terms and con-
ditions of the contract of October 4th, 1951, concerning 
change order extras as will be set forth in respondent'~ 
brief on cross appeal. 
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Appellants argue in sub-paragraph (b) of their 
Point III regarding the caluclation of total expenditures. 
In this brief, respondent has set forth by direct quo-
tations from, and reference to, the Record the testimony 
substantiating the exp'enditures on the project and again, 
here, reiterates that appellants' reference to the Peat, 
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. report in the appendix of appel-
lants' brief is improp'er and includes many items not 
within the Record of this Court and therefore could not 
properly be considered as a proper argument pertain-
ing to this appeal. 
Respondent again respectfully submits that appel-
lants had their own controll'er, William Ellis, in Court 
during the major portion of the trial between appellants 
and respondent and -to now attempt to improperly intro-
duce arguments and testimony pertaining to adjusting 
entries subsequent to the taking of testimony in this case 
is not proper. Respondent submits that the trial Court 
did properly take into consideration all items of con-
struction costs, including the awarding of judgments 
to other sub-contractors and litigants before the trial 
Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the above set forth costs 
as determined by the trial Court were proper in each 
and every respect and were substantiated by the evidence, 
both oral and documentary. Respondent further sub-
mits that any attempt by appellants to vary the actual 
facts before the Court and contained in the Record by 
submitting, as they did in their argument, certain ad-
justments through the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
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report, does not conform to the evidence and facts be-
fore the trial Court. It does not conform in any way 
to the testimony submitted by appellants themselves by 
and through th'eir controller, William Ellis, who was 
present during the entire trial between respondent and 
appellants. It is not supported by the actual books and 
records of Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Invest-
ment Corporation which were also before th'e trial Court 
and examined by Ellis repeatedly during the course of 
the trial. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSTRUED 
F.H.A. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Respondent has clearly set forth in his Statement 
of Facts, Pages 6 to 10, the matters pertaining to 
F .H. A. rules and regulations and the Wherry Housing 
Act. To repeat said matters here would take up addi-
tional and unnecessary space. Therefore, respondent 
makes reference to the matters contained in his State-
ment of Facts and the documentary evidence therein set 
forth supporting his position. In addition thereto, re-
spondent directs this Court's attention to the follow-
ing: 
Appellants' argument in re tire misinterpretation 
of the trial Court pertaining to disposition of escrow 
funds and the matters therein contained deals directly 
with whether or not appellant Harold J. Schnitzer should 
be entitled to 10% of th'e amount of the bid and this 
matter, together with the matter of Schnitzer's failure 
to provide financing, sub-paragraph (b) of appellants' 
Point IV, will be discussed in detail as a sub-division 
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of respondent's brief on cross appeal and respondent 
desires to refer to said section herein by reference in 
order to avoid repetition and use of space in this trial 
brief. 
Pertaining to said escrow fund, appellants, on Pages 
89 and 90 of their brief, set forth that these funds 
must be paid out by the escrow agent, Irving Trust Co., 
before any amount of the Mortgage is advanced for the 
construction of the housing project. However, appellants 
fail to point out the other provisions and requirements 
of Ex. 3, F .H.A. rules and regulations, the provisions 
and requirements of the Com1nitment for Mortgag'e In-
surance, the provisions and requirements of the Mort-
gage, which documents designated these funds as trust 
funds to be spent on the construction of the project itself 
and not to be returned to Harold J. Schnitzer individ-
ually. These matters will be discussed in respondent's 
brief on cross appeal. 
On Page 92 of their brief, appellants argue that 
Locke knew of the financial requirements pertaining to 
the construction of the various projects. It is true that 
Locke knew the financial requirements as set forth by 
various docu:rnents required by F .H.A. Locke knew 
that under the various regulations and the terms and 
conditions of the contract of October 4th, 1951, that 
Schnitzer was required to make the escrow deposits per-
taining to the Montana and Utah Projects. During the 
entire building of the Hill Air Force Base Housing Pro-
ject, Locke was engaged in the activities of a general 
construction superintendent and was relying upon 
Schnitzer to properly finance the project. Locke had 
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absolutely no knowledge until during the course of thi~ 
trial in the Court below how and in what manner Schnit-
zer had wrongfully and illegally withdrawn funds from 
Harsh Investment Corporation and Harsh Utah Cor-
poration and transferred funds from Harsh Construc-
tion Company in Montana, which eventually went into 
the pocket of Harold J. Schnitzer, in violation of the 
agreement of October 4th, 1951 between the parties. 
On Page 93 of their brief, appellants make reference 
to the testimony of William EHis concerning Ex. 195. 
In this connection, respondent desires to refer to Mr. 
Ellis' testimony under cross examination wherein he ad-
mitted that Ex. 195 disclosled an expenditure by Harsh 
Investment Corporation of the sum of $1,040,505.00 on 
matters pertaining to projects other than Hill Field Air 
Force Base Housing Project and also admitted that this 
Ex. 195 disclosed that Harsh Investment Corporation 
did not properly receive the required funds from Harsh 
Utah Corporation through Irving Trust Co. (T. 475, 
1079, 1082-1083, 1088) and further testified that, because 
Harold J. Schnitzer had siphoned off funds for his own 
personal use, there were insufficient funds with which 
to pay Harsh Investment Corporation the amount of 
the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum". (T. 1095). 
In appellants' arguments that the project was completely 
financed they completely ignore and disregard the ob-
ligation of Harsh Utah Corporation in its various con-
tracts with Harsh Investment Corporation. 
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POINT V. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT SUBSTANTIATE 
ADDITIONAL FUNDS DUE LOCKE PERTAINING 
TO THE CALIFORNIA PROJECT 
During the course of the trial evidence, both oral 
and documentary, was introduced pertaining to claims 
by respondent Locke for sums due and owing to him 
under an agreement with appellant Schnitzer pertaining 
to the Barstow, California, Marine Corps Housing Pro-
ject. 
1. The sum of $1500.00 for salary due and owing 
to Locke, Ex. 217 (T. 236). 
2. The sum of $5000.00 for bonus due and payable 
for services rendered on said Barstow Project, Ex. 217, 
(T. 956). 
3. The sum of $2,178.00 for expens'es due and owing 
to Locke, Ex. 217 (T. 145-M, 237). 
All of the above mentioned indebtednesses were raised 
by the issues before the Court and tried by the Court 
by the consent of the parties and without objections by 
appellants. The trial Court properly found that the 
sum of $8,678.00 was due and owing to respondent Locke, 
R. 103, 104. 
POINT VI. 
SET-OFFS DUE BY RESPONDENT LOCKE TO 
APPELLANTS SCHNITZER AND HARSH INVEST-
MENT CORPORATION WERE PROPERLY 
DETERMINED. 
During the course of the trial, appellants attempted 
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to establish that Locke had embezzled and misappropri 
ated c'ertain funds belonging to appellants. This was no 
supported by the evidence or the facts in any manne: 
whatsoever, as discussed heretofore in this brief. How 
ever, during the course of the trial Locke admitted tha 
he was indebted to appellants Schniher and Harsh In. 
vestment Corporation for certain iten1s, as follows: 
1. Promissory note executed by Locke in thE 
amount of $11,712.98, together with the sum oJ 
$1,000.00 for attorney's fees, as allowed by thE 
trial Court, R. 104. 
2. The sum of $2,885.93 for certain advance~ 
made by appellant Schnitzer and/or Harsh In. 
vestment Corporation, all of which were admittec 
by Locke with the exception of $1200.00 for thE 
purchase of a truck load of lumber, R. 105. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that all of the findings of the 
trial Court are supported by a great preponderance of 
the evidence. Respondent further submits that the trial 
Court had an opportunity, during the course of the trial, 
to view and observe the conduct and attitude of the 
witnesses before the trial Court and to determin'e the 
truth and veracity of the testimony given by said wit-
ness'es. Due to the fact that appellant Harold J. Schnit-
zer admitted during the course of trial that he did, in 
certain instances, commit perjury and due to the fact 
that perjury was likewise admitted by Walter E. Hutch· 
inson, one of the attorneys for appellants, it is only 
reasonable that th'e trial Court should believe the testi· 
mony submitted for and on behalf of respondent Oil 
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points where it might be in variance with, or different 
from, the testimony submitted for and on behalf of ap-
pellants. The trial Court, in this matter, should be th'e 
exclusive and only judge as to the character and credibil-
ity to be given the testimony before that Court. 
Respondent has, during the course of this bri'ef, 
completely supported all of the statements made in this 
brief by references to the transcript and record, both as 
to oral and documentary evidence submitted, although 
the record is filled with a considerable amount of ir-
relevant and immaterial matter, due to the leniency of 
the Court below in giving appellants every opportunity 
to substantiate their claims of fraud and misrepresenta-
tion. Nevertheless, the clear, positive evidence sup-
porting respondent's position is contained in the record, 
as compared to the complete lack of evidence and testi-
mony to support the theories of appellants. 
The position of respondent was, in every respect, 
during the course of the trial, substantiated by the testi-
mony of independent witnesses and documentary proof 
as against the position of appellants who, at no time 
during the course of the trial, produced any testimony 
whatsover from a single disinterested and/or independ-
ent witness to substantiate their claims and their posi-
tion. The only defense offered by appellants during the 
course of the trial was a malicious attempt to mislead 
the Court by the introduction of false testimony and 
documents, together with a malicious attempt to con-
fuse the true issues before the Court by allegations of 
misappropriation of funds and misconduct on the part of 
Locke that was not, in any way whatsoever, substantiated 
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by the evidenee, as is properly reflected in the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Court below. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON CROSS APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ON CROSS APPEAL 
During the construction of Hill Field Air Force 
Base Housing Project, certain contracts were entered 
into between Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh In-
vestment Corporation for change order extras, Exs. 164 
and 196. The contract amount of the approved change 
orders between Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh In-
vestment Corporation was in the amount of $333,952.55. 
In determining the amount of the additional income to 
Harsh Investment Corporation the trial Court deter-
mined the amount of additional income to Harsh Invest-
ment Corporation to be the amount testified to during 
the course of the trial as $178,672.00 which was the 
amount of additional mortgage proceeds to be received 
by Harsh Utah Corporation. Respondent submits that 
by the great weight of authority and the testimony of-
fered during the course of the trial the additional mort-
gage ben'efits received by Harsh Utah Corporation did 
not, in any way, control the amount of the contract be-
tween Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment 
Corporation. 
The trial Court should have determined the increase 
to which Harsh Investment Corporation was 'entitled, 
over and above the amount of the Construction Contract 
-"Lump Sum", to be the sum of $333,952.55, which was 
the amount contained on the face of the change orders 
and under the terms and conditions of the Construction 
Contract-"Lump Sum" and Articl'e 15 of the specifi-
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cations that should have been added on to the Construc-
tion Contract-"Lump Sum" of $2,995,205.00 in comput-
ing the bonus due Locke under the terms and conditions 
of the contract of October 4th, 1951. 
Under the terms and conditions of the October 4th, 
1951 agreement between Locke and Schnitzer, Schnitzer 
and/ or Harsh was to retain a sum of money equal to 
10% of the amount of the bid made by Harsh and ac-
cepted by the Government which, pertaining to the Hill 
Field Air Force Base Housing Project, would be th'e 
sum of $276,700.00. This provision in the contract be-
tween the parties was placed in the contract to compen-
sate Schnitzer for providing the needed capital for th'e 
construction of said project and to provide a means of 
returning to him the sum of $276,700.00. On July 21st, 
1952, Schnitzer did provide, from funds borrowed from 
his father-in-law and the First National Bank of Port-
land, Oregon, the sum of $611,200.00. By the terms and 
conditions of the F.H.A. rules and regulations, Ex. 3, 
the Financial Requirements for Closing, Ex. 188, the 
Commitment for Mortgage Insurance, Ex. 186, and by a 
great preponderance of the testimony during the course 
of the trial, even from appellants' own witness, Walter 
E. Hutchinson, secretary of Harsh Utah Corporation, 
these funds were to remain on deposit during the en-
tire construction period to insure that sufficient funds 
would be available to comptetely finance the construction 
of the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project. A 
certain portion of said funds was also required, under 
the F.H.A. rules and regulations, to establish the equity 
of Harsh Utah Corporation over and above the amount 
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of tlre mortgage proceeds. The resolution of Harsh 
Utah Corporation passed by the Board of Directors on 
July 21st, 1952 at the time said deposit was n1ade with 
the mortgagee, provides as follows: 
"RESOLVED: That since Harsh Utah Corpora-
tion has received the benefits accruing from the 
advances of $624,994.00 to the corporation that 
the offer of Mr. Schnitzer to forego demand for 
reimbursement of said sum on the understanding 
that the corporation would accept such sum as 
contributed surplus is hereby accepted. The 
books of the corporation shall b'e set up in a 
manner to reflect the fact that Mr. Schnitzer has 
contributed the sum of $624,994.00 as contributed 
surplus". Page 13, Ex. 161. 
Contrary to the terms of this resolution, Schnitzer did 
not forego demand for reimbursement and contrary to 
the F.H.A. rul'es and regulations, the Commitment for 
Mortgage Insurance, the Building and Loan Agreement 
and the Mortgage, as well as in violation of the agree-
ment of October 4th, 1951, Schnitzer withdrew a total 
of $631,000.00 from Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh 
Investment Corporation between November 5th, 1952 
and March 24th, 1953. T. 1094-1095; 143-146; 163-168). 
The funds withdrawn by Schnitzer were $19,800.00 in 
excess of any funds originally provided by Schnitzer. 
Prior to the execution of the agreement of October 
4th, 1951, Schnitzer induced Locke to give up hls 50% 
joint venture in the ownership of the Wherry Housing 
Projects as set forth in respondent's brief in order to 
·enable Schnitzer to raise additional funds with which 
to finance said projects by selling stock in the owner-
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ship corporations. After the agreement of October 4th, 
1951 was signed by Locke, Schnitzer did not sell any of 
the stock but retained all of said stock himself and in 
violation of the agreement of October 4th, 1951, did not 
leave the funds on deposit as contemplated by the 
parties. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON CROSS APPEAL 
POINT I. 
THE AMOUNT OF THE CHANGE ORDER 
EXTRAS SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE 
SUM OF $333,952.55 INSTEAD OF $178,672.00. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE 
ALLOWED APPE:LLANTS TO RECEIVE 10% 
OF THE AMOUNT OF THE BID, TO WIT, 
$276,700.00 BEFORE DETERMINING THE 
AMOUNT OF BONUS RESPONDENT LOCKE 
WAS ENTITLED TO. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE AMOUNT OF THE CHANGE ORDER 
EXTRAS SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE 
SUM OF $333,952.55 INSTEAD OF $178,672.00. 
The change orders were supplemental contracts be-
tween Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investm'ent 
Corporation as builder. According to the terms and 
conditions of the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum", 
Ex. 61, contractor is entitled to extras for change orders 
in accordance with the specifications, Ex. 1. 
Article XV of the specifications reads, in part, as 
follows: 
"Art. XV-Changes in the Work: The owner, 
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without invalidating the contract, may order 
extra work, or make changes by altering, adding to 
or deducting from the work, the contract sum 
being adjusted accordingly ... the value of any 
such extra work on changes shall be determined in 
one or more of the following ways: 
(a) By estimate and acceptanc'e in a lump sum; 
(b) By unit prices named in the contract or 
subsequ'ently agreed upon; 
(c) By cost and percentage or by cost and 
fixed fee". 
During the course of construction Harsh Utah Corpora-
tion and Harsh Investment Corporation executed change 
orders 1 through 79 pertaining to the construction of the 
Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project, Exs. 164 and 
196. These change orders were signed by both Harsh 
Utah Corporation as owner and mortgagor and by Harsh 
Investment Corporation as contractor. The procedure 
followed was, as set forth in (a) above, by estimate and 
acc'eptance in a lump sum (T. 347-350, 1123-1125 ). See 
also appendix, Pages 23 to 29. 
Respondent submits that the terminology of the 
change orders themselves constitute binding contracts be-
tween the two corporations. The terminology on th·e face 
of each change order, Exs. 164 and 196, is as follows: 
"Contractor, mortgagor and mortgagee indicate 
by signing this request that: It is the expressed 
intention to execute the changes described here-
in; it is understood that FHA acceptance will 
be determined without regard to cost and in no 
way implies acceptance of or compliance with 
mortgagor's statement of cost; it is also under-
stood that when F.H.A. has estimated and sum-
marized the costs of all accepted changes and the 
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net effect thereof is a decrease in the total con-
struction cost, the insurable amount may be 
similarly decreased but if the net effect is an in-
crease above the mortgage amount the additional 
costs will be defrayed by the mortgagor." 
The procedure followed pertaining to these change 
orders was as follows: The change orders were insti-
tuted by the mortgagor, the owner, Harsh Utah Corpo-
ration, setting forth the desired changes requested and 
the amount of money that the mortgagor would pay to 
the contractor, Harsh Investment Corporation, to 'exe-
cute these changes. The change orders were then sub-
mitted to F.H.A. for two purposes: First, to obtain the 
approval of the Inspection Division of F.H.A. to change 
the plans and specifications to incorporate the changes 
requested irrrespective of any monetary consideration 
thereof. Secondly, for F.H.A. to then make an ap-
praisal for the purposes of submitting figures to the 
mortgagee, Irving Trust Co., stating, in 'effect, that in 
the event that the change orders outlined on the re-
quest were performed that the insurable mortgage on 
the Hill Fi'eld Air Force Base Housing Project could 
be increased by so many dollars. See appendix, Pages 
23 to 29. 
Many of the change orders submitted by Harsh Utah 
Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation were 
approved by the F.H.A. and incorporated in a change 
in the original plans and specifications for the construc-
tion of Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project. 
The total monetary value submitted on the approved 
changes by Harsh Utah Corporation indicated that the 
increased costs of Harsh Investment Corporation as 
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the builder in executing these change orders would be in 
the amount of $333,952.55 (T. 298-303, 434-435). See 
appendix, Pages 30 to 32. Under the terms and condi-
tions of the change orders themselves-"IF THE NE'l, 
EFFECT IS AN INCREASE ABOVE THE MORT-
GAGE AMOUNT THE ADDITIONAL COSTS WILL 
BE DE,FRAYED BY THE MORTGAGOR", respond-
ent submits that Harsh Utah Corporation would be 
obligated to pay to Harsh Investment Corporation the 
sum of $333,952.55. 
Harsh Utah Corporation did receive an increase in 
its F .H.A. insured mortgage, according to the testimony 
at the time of trial, in the sum of $178,672.00 which the 
trial Court computed in its Findings of Fact as an in-
crease in the construction contract. However, respond-
'ent submits that by the terms and conditions of the 
Construction Contract-"Lump Sum", and the specifi-
cations, the amount of the increase that should have 
been computed that Harsh Utah Corporation was to 
pay to Harsh Investment Corporation was in the amount 
of $333,952.55, in computing the bonus due Locke pur-
suant to the agreement of Octob'er 4th, 1951. 
It is utterly absurd to suppose that in executing the 
agreement of October 4th the parties intended that 
the "Lump Sum" construction contractor would be re-
quired to do any "extra" work at the owner's request 
for only 90% of cost (the mortgage figure) if F.H.A. 
approved, and for nothing if F. H. A. disapproved the 
change for mortgage purposes. 
Such an arrangement would have empowered 
Schnitzer to double the size of the project without any 
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increase in the contract price as a "change order" and 
thus insure that no construction profit would be realized. 
Tirey must have intended the usual and customary 
arrangements between owner and builder whereby con-
struction "contract sum" would be adjusted according 
to the increase in work performed. And that was what the 
construction contract, executed by Schnitzer himself, 
did provide. 
The amount of income for change order extras 
should have been $333,952.55, the contract price therefor. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE 
ALLOWED APPELLANTS TO RECEIVE 10% 
OF THE AMOUNT OF THEr BID. 
Appellants should not have recived 10% of th'e 
amount of the bid inasmuch as there was a total failure 
of consideration, and that special "finance fee" was 
never earned. Under the terms and conditions of 
the October 4th, 1951 agreement, Harsh was to retain 
a sum of money equal to 10% of th'e total amount of 
the bid made by Harsh and accepted by the Government. 
There apparently is no dispute that this provision was 
placed in the contract as compensation to Harsh and/or 
Schnitzer in exchange for the obligation of Schnitz'er to 
provide certain capital required for the construction of 
the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project. See 
appellant's brief, p. 65, where it is declared (correctly) 
that the parties knew that all money and credit would 
have to be furnished by Schnitzer personally. The 
testimony of both Schnitzer and Locke was that whereas 
Locke had a 50% joint venture ownership interest 
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in contracts executed prior to the October 4th, 1951 
agreement, Exs. 157 and 158, Locke gave up his owner-
ship interest becaus'e of representations made by Harold 
J. Schnitzer that he would be required to dispose of 
capital stock of the ownership corporation in order to 
finance more than one project. (T. 32M, 33M, 411\f, 77-
79). 
Contrary to Schnitzer's representations to Locke 
that he had to dispose of stock in the corporation, 
Schnitzer did not dispose of any of the stock nor did he 
invest any of his own funds whatsoever for a stock 
interest in any of the three Wherry Housing Proj'ects. 
Walter E. Hutchinson, Secretary of Harsh Utah Cor-
poration testified (T. 824) that Schnitzer had not paid 
5c for a stock interest in any of his corporations per-
taining to the owning and construction of the Wherry 
Housing Projects. Respondent submits that from the 
testimony of appellant Schnitzer himself, he expected a 
return of the funds deposited in escrow by himself for 
the benefit of Harsh Utah Corporation through the pro-
visions in th'e October 4th, 1951 agreement returning to 
Schnitzer and/or Harsh 10% of the bid. This intent 
is expressed in his testimony ( T. 861) as follows: "And 
I determined at that time that the amount which I felt 
was the minimum sum which would be necessary for me 
to undertake this typ'e of operation with Mr. Locke 
entire project of the first profits. The first $150,000.00 
would have to be turned to me before our 10% of our 
would be a return to me first from all profits of the 
bid would first have to be return'ed to me before a di-
vision between myself and Mr. Locke". It is submitted 
that this language clearly indicates the method and 
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manner the funds were to be return'ed to Schnitzer that 
he had advanced. However, the testimony clearly shows, 
as set forth herein, that he not only received a return 
of all of the funds advanced by himself within a short 
period of time but, in fact, received some $19,800.00 in 
excess thereof. 
Under the F.H.A. rules and regulations, Schnitzer 
was required to furnish certain funds to Harsh Utah 
Corporation to provide an escrow amount to insure the 
adequate financing and completion of the Hill Field Air 
Force Base Housing Project, Exs. 3 and 188. According 
to the terms and conditions of the Building and Loan 
Agreement, Ex. 64, these funds were to be treated as 
trust funds and were to be used for payment of expenses 
over and above the mortgage in the construction of Hill 
Field Air Force Base Housing Project. Inasmuch as 
thes'e requirements were set forth in Ex. 3 it is apparent 
that both Locke and Schnitzer knew of these require-
ments prior to the October 4th, 1951 agreement and the 
provision in that agreement allowing Harsh to retain 
10% of the total amount of th'e bid before computing 
the bonus to which Locke would be entitled, was un-
questionably the means by which Schnitzer was to be 
compensated for providing the capital necessary, which 
should have been retain'ed in the project at Hill Field 
in the total amount of $620,000.00 and a similar amount 
pertaining to the Great Falls Montana Air Force Base 
Housing Project. 
Pertaining to the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing 
Project, Schnitzer did provide a total of $611,200.00 for 
a short period of tim'e. The sources of these funds, ac-
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cording to the testimony, are as follows : 
$14,200.00 from his own personal account. 
$97,000.00 borrowed from Harsh Construction 
Company, which funds were likewise trust funds 
pertaining to the Great Falls Air Force Base 
Housing Project. 
$100,000.00 borrowed from Jennings Furniture 
Company, a company owned by his fath'er-in-law. 
$100,000.00 borrowed from Metropolitan Stores, 
likewise owned by his father-in-law. 
$300,000.00 borrowed from the First National 
Bank of Portland, Oregon. 
These funds were obtained in July of 1952 (T. 140-142). 
On July 21st, 1952, Harsh Utah Corporation held a 
meeting of its Board of Directors in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. This was the date that the "formal closing" of 
all F .H.A. requirements and the formal execution of 
certain documents pertaining to Hill Field Air Force 
Base Housing Project took place. In order to meet 
these requirements the Board of Directors of Harsh 
Utah Corporation submitted the following Minutes and 
Resolution pertaining to the above mentioned funds 
supplied by Harold J. Schnitz'er, Ex. 161 at Page 13: 
MINUTES OF SPECIAL MEETING OF DIRECTORS 
OF 
HARSH UTAH CORPORATION 
A special meeting of the Board of Directors of the 
Harsh Utah Corporation was held at Judge Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, on July 21st, 1952, at 4:00 P. M. 
The meeting was called to order by the President, Mr. 
Harold J. Schnitzer, and Minutes of such m'eeting were 
reported by the Secretary, Mr. Walter E. Hutchinson. 
The President stated that all directors had in writ-
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ing waived notice of such meeting and directed that such 
waiver b'e attached to the Minutes of the meeting. 
Mr. Schnitzer then stated that the purpose of the 
meeting was to discuss the compliance of FHA financial 
requirements for closing of loan previously authorized 
by the Board of Directors. He reported that he had 
advanced in behalf of the Corporation in connection 
with the housing project undertaken the amount of the 
FHA application and commitment fee; that he had de-
posited $25,000.00 with tll'e U. S. Air Force as a security 
deposit to assure that construction of the project would 
corrunence. 
Mr. Schnitzer then stated that prior to the closing 
of the loan it was necessary that the Corporation deposit 
with the Irving Trust Company the sum of $39,552.00 
as working capital to assure that there would be funds 
to pay certain pre-opening expenses, the purpose of such 
deposit being to take care of expenses in those cases 
where the rental income was not sufficient to pay such 
expenses, and it was further required at the time of 
closing that the Corporation deposit with Irving Trust 
Company the difference between the cost of the proj'ect, 
as estimated by the FHA, and the amount of the mort-
gage loan, which difference was in the sum of $585,442.00. 
Mr. Schnitzer th'en stated that since the Corporation 
was required to raise the amounts stated prior to clos-
ing and as he was the owner of the outstanding stock 
of the Corporation except for the qualifying shares as 
required under the laws of Utah, he had, in order to 
assure the completion of the project and the success of 
the Corporation, advanced such sum to the Corporation 
on the understanding that such sums would be accepted 
by the Corporation as an additional contribution to sur-
plus, notwithstanding the fact that in his opinion the 
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construction of th'e project could be accomplished for a 
sum less than that estimated by the FHA. 
After some discussion, the directors, being of the 
unanimous opinion that such an arrangement would 
meet th'e requirements of the FHA and be of benefit 
to the Corporation, presented the following resolution: 
RESOLVED: That since Harsh Utah Corporation 
has received the benefits accruing froin the ad-
vance of $624,994.00 to the corporation that the 
offer of Mr. Schnitzer to forego demand for reim-
bursement of said sum on the understanding that 
the corporation would accept such sum as con-
tributed surplus is hereby accepted. The books 
of the corporation shall be set up in such manner 
as to reflect the fact that Mr. Schnitzer has con-
tributed the sum of $624,994.00 as contributed 
surplus. 
HAROLD J. SCHNITZER 
WALTER E. HUTCHINSON President 
Secretary 
It should be noted that this meeting was held and 
this resolution adopted at the same time that the funds 
were contributed to the surplus of Harsh Utah Cor-
poration. 
It is also pertinent to note that when Schnitzer 
withdrew this contributed surplus, as hereinafter more 
particularly s'et out, he not only violated his contract 
with Locke, and the F.H.A. regulations, but he also 
violated the laws of Utah. Under the Utah Code it was 
and is unlawful to pay any corporate dividend except 
out of the "surplus profits arising from the business of 
the corporation," or to withdraw or pay to any stock-
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holder any part of the assets of the corporation 'except 
as provided by statutory law. 
Sections 16-2-15 and 76-13-4, subsections (1) and 
(2), U.C.A. 1953; 
Pace v. Pace Bros. Co. 91 Utah 149, 63 P 2d 
590. 
Attention is directed to the obvious language of the 
above set forth resolution, uthe offer of Mr. Schnitzer to 
forego dema;nd for reimbursement of said sum" 
($624,994.00). It is very apparent that Schnitzer knew 
from the language of the above set forth resolution that 
lie could not lawfully, under the provisions of his agree-
ment with Locke, withdraw any of said funds for his 
own personal use and benefit. 
During the course of the trial in the Court below, 
when respondent pressed Schnitzer and Ellis, over 
violent objections from Schnitzer's counsel, to account 
for said funds, it was disclosed that between November 
5th, 1952 and March 24th, 1953, Schnitzer had withdrawn 
from Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment 
Corporation a total of $631,000.00. (T. 163-168), as 
follows: 
November 5th, 1952, $4,000.00 from Harsh Invest-
ment Corporation. 
N ovemb'er 15th, 1952, $250,000.00 from Harsh 
Utah Corporation. 
November 17th, 1952, $3,000.00 from Harsh In-
vestment Corporation. 
November 24th, 1952, $50,000.00 from Harsh Utah 
Corporation. 
February 25th, 1953, $220,000.00 from Harsh 
Utah Corporation. 
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March 24th, 1953, $104,000.00 fron1 Harsh Utah 
Corporation. 
Total, $631,000.00. (T. 163-168) 
This fact was not known to Locke until this testimony 
was elicited during the course of the trial. 
Schnitzer knew that by withdrawing these funds 
he was in direct violation of his agre'ement with Locke 
and when it appeared, early in the trial, that this fact 
was going to be brought before the Court below, he 
hurriedly, with the assistance of Walter E. Hutchinson, 
one of his attorneys from Portland, Oregon, prepared 
a false and fraudulent purported corporate resolution 
in an attempt to veil his unlawful withdrawals with cor-
porate authority. In introducing the purported minutes 
and resolution authorizing the withdrawal, both Schnit-
zer and Hutchinson testified that the minutes and reso-
lution were prepared in Portland, Oregon, on or about 
April 1st, 1953 in the office of Walter E. I-Iutchinson. 
When presented to the trial Court the purported minutes 
and resolution were neatly enclosed within the Minute 
Book of Harsh Utah Corporation, Ex. 161, at Page 17. 
The testimony from Hutchinson and Schnitzer pertain-
ing to this document was presented to the trial Court 
on June lOth, 1954. 
After this document had been presented, respond-
ent's attorney, John M. Sherman, compared this docu-
ment with a document filed by Mr. King the day before, 
June 9th, 1954, entitled "Demand For Production of 
Documents", R. 31 and 32 which was obviously prepared 
in his office and engaged the services of J. Percy God-
dard of Salt Lake City as an expert to compare said 
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documents. Mr. Goddard, with the assistance of a 
photographer, William Hollis Shipler, identified the 
above mentioned two documents as having been prepared 
on the same typewriter. (T. 213-M- 232-M, Ex. 229). 
The introduction of the above mentioned exp'ert 
testimony identifying the typewriter upon which the pur-
ported resolution was written and the testimony of 
Donald H. Terry, an investigator engaged by respond-
ent's attorney, (T. 656-722), forced Schnitzer and Hut-
chinson to return to the witness stand on June 21st, 
1954 and admit that they had given false, fraudulent 
testimony pertaining to said corporate resolution. The 
resolution herein referred to and the minutes pertain-
ing thereto are set forth as follows: 
MINUTES OF SPECIAL MEETING OF DIRECTORS 
OF 
HARSH UTAH CORPORATION 
A special meeting of the Board of Directors of 
Harsh Utah Corporation was held at the offices of the 
corporation in Portland, Oregon, on April 1, 1953, at 
3:00 o'clock P.M. The meeting was called to order by 
the President, Mr. Harold J. Schnitzer, and minutes of 
such meeting were recorded by the Secretary, Mr. Walter 
E. Hutchinson. 
The President stated that all directors had in writ-
ing waived notice of said meeting and directed that said 
waiver be attached to the minutes of the meeting. 
Mr. Schnitzer then stated that the purpose of the 
meeting was to discuss the return of $624,994.00 which 
Mr. Schnitzer had contributed to the capital surplus of 
the corporation on July 21, 1952, in order to assist this 
corporation in its compliance with requirements of the 
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Federal Housing Administration in the closing of its 
insured mortgage loan. 
Mr. Schnitzer then stated that in his opinion the 
purpose for which said contribution to the capital sur-
plus had been made were now consumated and that it 
was no longer necessary that the corporation retain said 
contribution. 
After some discussion, the directors being of the 
unanimous opinion that it was no longer necessary that 
the corporation retain said capital contribution, the 
corporation adopted the following resolution: 
RESOLVED, that since Harsh Utah Corporation 
has received the benefits accruing from the ad-
vance of $624,994.00 to the corporation and that 
it is no longer essential to the business of the 
corporation that it continue to retain said con-
tribution, that the said capital contribution of 
$624,994.00 be returned to Mr. Schnitzer at this 
time, and that the books of the corporation be set 
up in such manner as to reflect the return of said 
contribution to the capital surplus of this corpor-
ation. 
HAROLD J. SCHNITZER 
WALTER E. HUTCHINSON President 
Secretary 
It is interesting to note the ridiculous and incon-
sistent means to which Schnitzer and his attorneys re-
sorted in their attempt to defraud Locke out of his 
legitimate claims. This purported corporate resolution 
is diametrically opposed to the earlier corporate reso-
lution of July 21st, 1952 of Harsh Utah Corporation per-
taining to the deposit of said funds wherein Schnitzer 
offered to forego any demand for reimbursement. 
In their anxiety to vindicate Schnitzer's illegal with-
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drawal of the above mentioned $631,000.00 Schnitzer, 
and Hutchinson hastily prepared a corporate reso-
lution pertaining thereto which is without any legal 
force or eff'ect whatsoever nor it is capable of intelligent 
interpretation. Respondent's attorneys are still unable, 
even as of the writing of this brief, to understand the 
meaning of said resolution. It provides that $624,994.00 
be return'ed to Schnitzer and it also provides that the 
books of the corporation be adjusted "to reflect the 
return of said contribution to capital surplus of this 
corporation". Even in his greatest day, Houdini would 
have failed in this endeavor. 
It is also interesting to note that the means em-
ployed by Schnitzer and his counsel in their attempt to 
defraud Locke were not only inconsistent within the 
minutes and resolutions of Harsh Utah Corporation 
themselves but th'ey are, as well, illegal, unlawful and 
ridiculous. Perhaps the factor that greatly assisted in 
this futile drama was the personnel of the Board of Di-
rectors of Harsh Utah Coproration itself, Harold J. 
Schnitzer, his wife, Arlene Schnitzer and his co-con-
spirator and co-defendant, Walter E. Hutchinson. In 
fairness respondents' attorneys desire to comment that 
in examining Ex. 161, the Minute Book of Harsh Utah 
Corporation the signature of Arlene Schnitzer is con-
spicuous by its absence from any corporate resolution 
or minutes therein contained and from any waiver of 
notice of any meeting purportedly held. 
According to the testimony as finally disclosed to 
the trial Court, this resolution was prepared between 
9 :00 A. M. and 9 :40 A. M. in Salt Lake City the morning 
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it was introduced into evidenc'e before the trial Court, 
June lOth, 1954. (T. 656-722). 
The above set forth purported resolution is further 
inconsistent in that it recites a return of funds to Schnit-
zer totalling $624,994.00 whereas in truth and in fact 
he had already withdrawn $631,000.00. The greater 
portion of this sum had been withdrawn in the month of 
November, 1952 and all of said withdrawals were made 
without the benefit of any resolution whatsoever. 
It is further submitted that the sourC'e of the funds 
were trust funds under the Building and Loan Agree-
ment to be used to pay for the costs of constructing the 
Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project; that said 
funds were withdrawn from tire Irving Trust Co. on 
requisitions for funds, Ex. 141, which contained on each 
the signature of Harold J. Schnitzer certifying that the 
funds would be used for the purpose of paying for the 
actual expenses of construction of the project. The only 
possible way that Harsh Utah Corporation could ob-
tain F. H. A. insurance on said mortgage advances was 
on the basis of the certifications made in Ex. 141. 
Respondent Locke had knowledge of and relied upon 
th'e requirements of the Harsh Utah Corporation reso-
lution of July 21st, 1952, wherein "the offer of Mr. 
Schnitzer to forego demand for reimbursement of said 
sum" was made. Locke further knew of the terminology 
and requirements of the docum'ents contained in Ex. 141, 
Requisition for Funds, and in good faith had expected 
Schnitzer to abide by the above mentioned requirements 
when he entered into the agreement of October 4th, 1951, 
tire terms of which provided for a return of 10% of the 
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amount of the bid to Schnitzer. 
The testimony and record further reveals that appel-
lant Schnitzer did not, at any time, have any cash in-
vested in any of the corporations pertaining to the 
Wherry Housing Projects and without the permanent 
investment of any funds, acquired an ownership interest 
for the duration of a 75-year lease that provides him 
with a tax-free income of approximately $100,000.00 P'er 
year. (T. 90-M, 91-M). 
As a direct result of the withdrawal of the above 
mentioned funds, Harsh Utah Corporation did not have 
sufficient funds with which to pay Harsh Investment 
Corporation the amount of the Construction Contract -
"Lump Sum" or the amount of the change order extras. 
(T. 829, 1095, 1120-1122, 1151, 1164). 
The testimony reveals that in addition to the pro-
ceeds of the mortgage the sum of $620,000.00 capital 
required of Schnitzer would be the funds available for 
the construction of the Hill Fi:eld Air Force Base Hous-
ini Project. (T. 1115, 829-830, 987-992), see appendix 
Pages 15-21, 34-37, and there appears to be no doubt 
that at the time of entering into the agreement of Octo-
ber 4th, 1951, app'ellant Schnitzer knew that these funds 
were to be trust funds that would remain on deposit at 
least until the completion of the project and that a sub-
stantial portion thereof would amount to a permanent 
investment in exchange for acquiring the own'ership 
interest in the leasehold improvements. Locke relied 
on Schnitzer to perform this part of the agreem'ent 
when he relinquished his ownership interest and signed 
the October 4th, 1951 agreement. 
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The trial court after a careful consideration of th( 
record and of the reliability of the several witnesse~ 
found as a fact that it was the intent of the parties i11 
entering into the contract of October 4, 1951, tha1 
Schnitzer and/or Harsh would provide all necessar~ 
financing in accordance with F. H. A. regulations 
and the requirements of the mortgagee, but that 
in fact neither of them did so and that such failure 
was a material breach of the contract with Locke (R 96-
97 ; Findings 13 to 15). 
These and the other findings of the trial court are 
supported by the evidence received at the trial, and 
under Utah law will not be disturbed by this court un-
less it clearly appears that they are against the manifest 
weight of the evidence, which is not the case, as the 
findings are clearly supported by the record. 
This doctrine is so firmly established by a multitude 
of cases that no citation should be needed. However, 
for the convenience of the court we append citations to 
a few of the decisions establishing this doctrine : 
McKay v. Farr 
15 Utah 261, 49 Pac. 649 ; 
Elliott v. Whitmore 
23 Utah 462, 65 Pac. 70; 
Sidney Stevens Implement Company v. South 
Ogden Land Building and Improvement Company 
20 Utah 267, 58 Pac. 843; 
Hansen vs. Mutual Finance Corporation, 84 Utah 
579, 37 p 2d 782; 
Wilcox v. Cloward 
88 Utah 503, 56 P 2d 1; 
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Shaw v. Jeppson 
Utah , 239 P 2d 745; 
Lawlor v. Lawlor 
Utah , 240 P 2d 271. 
The trial court, however, furtlrer found that this 
breach did not damage Locke other than by increasing 
awards to sub-contractors for their damages and costs, 
which were eliminated in computing Locke's bonus, and 
then concluded (as a finding) that Schnitzer therefore 
had not lost his right to retain 10% of the amount of 
his bid. In reaching this conclusion the trial court mis-
apprehended and failed to apply the legal theory on 
which this issue was submitted to the court, and con-
sequently,it is submitted, fell into inadvertent error of 
law. 
Recovery of damages for breach of contract is not 
respondent's theory on this issue. This issue was and 
is submitted on respondent's theory that Schnitzer had 
no right to this 10% "financing fee" because he never 
earned it-because he never performed the financing 
service which, under the contract, was the consideration 
for and the condition precedent to his right to exclude 
this 10% in computing Locke's share of construction 
profits. 
It should also be noted that Locke does not se·ek 
to recover the entire amount of 10% of the bid. He 
seeks only to have this "financing expense" disallowed 
as a cost in computing his bonus, just as a claimed ex-
pense for material or equipment which was never furn-
ished would be disallowed as a cost in computing the 
construction profit and the bonus. 
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To illustrate, suppose that on the accounting 
Schnitzer had claimed credit in the sum of $250,000 as 
rental for construction equipment alleged to have been 
leased by him for use on the project, but the proof 
showed that no such equipment had ever been furnished 
by him or used by the contractor on the project. It is 
clear that such claim would have to be disallowed, and 
that Schnitzer would never be permitted to pay himself 
$250,000 for equipment never actually furnished or used, 
even though he had a contract under which he might 
have earned that rental if he had furnished the equip-
ment. 
Similarly Schnitzer cannot be allowed to pay him-
self $276,700.00 as a charge or fee for financing which 
he never furnished. 
Let us consider once more, briefly, the background 
and the contract of the parti'es. Prior to the October 
4th agreement Locke owned a joint interest in the entire 
project, both ownership and construction. Locke was 
induced to give up his ownership interest by Schnitz'er's 
representations that Schnitzer could not perform his 
obligation to finance the entire project, as contemplated 
by the parties and required by law, unless Locke re-
leased his interest in the owning company stock so 
that the stock could be pledged or sold by Schnitzer. 
But Schnitzer agreed that Locke was to have, instead, 
a one-half interest, by way of bonus , in "the net profit 
earned by Harsh in connection with the construction of 
the aforesaid projects." The net construction profit 
obviously was intended to be computed by subtracting 
from the gross construction income the total of the 
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proper allowable construction costs and ·expenses-but 
here Schnitzer and his advisors insisted on one notable 
addition. The contract drawn by them provided in ef-
fect that Schnitzer's "finance fee" of 10% of the bid 
(or $276,700) should be considered and deducted as if 
it were a construction cost, which it was not. This, as 
the court properly found, was in consideration of Schnit-
zer's undertaking properly to finance the entire project, 
both construction and ownership. This "financing fee' 
was to be retain'ed by Harsh, Schnitzer's wholly owned 
corporation-doubtless for the purpose of saving the 
increased income taxes which would have become due 
if this finance fee had been paid to Schnitzer p'ersonally 
by either the owner corporation or the contractor cor-
poration. 
It must be remembered that all these contracts were 
drawn by Schnitz'er or his own attorneys, and so under 
familiar rules must be construed most strictly against 
him. 
But, as the court found, neither Schnitzer nor any 
of his corporations ever performed this obligation to 
finance the project-he never delivered th'e "quid pro 
quo" for which his corporation was to be allowed to 
charge and retain a "financing fee" of $276,700 against 
the construction profit as if it were a construction cost 
(which it was not). Having failed to pay the agr'eed 
"quid pro quo" for this profitable privilege, neither 
Schnizter nor his corporation are entitled, in law or in 
equity, or in good conscience, to retain and use in this 
suit the right and privilege or the mon·eys for which the 
consideration has failed by reason of their own mere-
tricious default. 
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The contract of October 4th is obviously divisible 
under the evidence, the findings of tlre court, and the 
law. The principal agreement is that Locke is to re-
ceive a monthly salary plus a bonus of 50% of the con-
struction profits in return for his assistance in biddinig 
the project and acting as superintendent of construction. 
The other, and severable agreement was that Schnitzer 
is to be paid a financing fee of 10% of the Government 
bid or $276,700, out of the first construction profits as 
consideration for his financing of the entire project. But 
as he did not finance the project, he has not earned his 
financing fee, and should not be allowed to retain the 
same and charge it against the construction profits, any 
more than he should be permitted to retain purported 
fees for equipment rental on equipment never actually 
furnished. 
By reason of his default the second, and severabl'e, 
clause or agreement in the contract has failed and is 
unenforceable, leaving only the principal agreem'ent for 
Locke's bonus of 50% in force and good standing be-
fore the court. The agreement for a bonus, which Locke 
has fully performed, can and should b'e enforced without 
reference to or consideration of the severable agree-
ment for the retention of a financing fee which was 
n'ever earned. If the unearned financing fee is dis-
allowed, that automatically increases the agreed con-
struction profits by the amount of the fee, and Locke was 
and is entitled to a judgment for one-half of the con-
struction profits computed without first deducting that 
unearn'ed finance fee. In failing to grant such judg-
ment the trial court (through misapprehension of the 
theory on which the matter was finally submitted, as 
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respondent believes) fell into error. 
That the contract was divisible on th·e basis above 
outlined seems abundantly clear from the record and 
the law. The fact that the balance of the contract was 
actually performed without Schnitzer furnishing the 
agreed financing is itself conclusive evidence that the 
contract is one which in its nature and purpose is 
susceptible of division and apportionment. The project 
could be and was built without personal financing by 
Schnitzer. Harsh Utah could have borrowed against 
its anticipated rentals in order to pay construction costs 
over the amount of the mortgage. Even now it appears 
that the balance due the contractor on the lump-sum 
contract and the "change order extras" will have to be 
paid out of these rentals. Moreover, as the court found, 
the parties th'emselves allocated the 10% as consider-
ation for Schnitzer's financing, separate and apart from 
the other portion of their agreements. 
Under these circumstances, it is submitted, the 
agreement for a finance fee to be paid to Schnitzer is 
severable from the principal contract under the rules 
announced in 
17 CJS "Contracts", Sections 331 to 334, and cases 
cited. 
Moreover, it is a familiar rule that in actions on 
severable contracts a partial failure of consideration is 
a defense pro tanto. 
17 CJS "Contracts", Section 130, Note 49. 
The same rule certainly should apply when, as here, 
on an accounting one party (Schnitzer) claims credit 
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for an item the consideration for which has failed. 
Locke is also entitled to recover one-half of tlH 
amount of this forfeited "finance fee' under the equitable 
principles of quasi-contracts. 
Gen'erally a right quasi contractu arises out of "un. 
just enrichment" of one party at the expense of another: 
"A person unjustly enriched at the expense 
of another is required to make restitution to the 
other." 
Restatement of the Law: 
Restitution, Section 1. 
However, there are cases in which the right of 
action ex quasi contractu arises 'even though the unjust 
enrichment is not at the expense of the plaintiff. As 
the Restatement says, 
"In other situations, a benefit has been re-
ceived by the defendant but the plaintiff has not 
suffered a corresponding loss or, in some cases 
any loss, but nevertheless, the enrichment of the 
defendant would be unjust. In such cases the 
def'endant may be under a duty to give to the 
plaintiff the amount by which he has been en-
riched. Thus where a person with knowledge 
of the facts wrongfully disposes of the property 
of another and makes a profit thereby, he is 
accountable for the profit and not merely for 
the value of the property of the other with which 
he wrongfully dealt (see §151)." 
Restatem'ent of the Law: 
Restitution §1, comment e. 
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These principles are, of course, recognized in Utah. 
Baugh v. Darby 
112 u. 1, 184 p. 2d 335. 
The basis for these rights is essentially equitable, 
even though the common law afforded a remedy. An 
excellent case outlining the basis and history of the 
right and the remedy was handed down by the Supreme 
Court of Ohio in 1938. It is 
Hummel v. Hummel 
14 N.E. 2d 923. 
In that case a parent, who had paid all the pr'emiums 
on an insurance policy on his son, recovered from his 
son in quasi contract all of the proceeds of cashing the 
policy, even though they exceeded the amount he had 
paid out in premiums. This case arose out of an oral 
agreement between them which the father could not 
enforce because of the statute of frauds. The Ohio Court 
refused to permit the son to 'enrich himself by refusing 
to recognize his obligation, even though that obligation 
was based only on morals and was not legally enforce-
able. 
The case at bar is even stronger, for here th'ere is 
nothing illegal or void about Schnitzer's undertaking 
to provide all required financing for the Housing Pro-
jects. This is an 'equitable case, and equity, morals, 
and good conscienC'e all join in requiring that Schnitzer 
be not allowed to profit by his own wrong in wilfully 
breaching his contract and then falsifying records with 
the obvious purpose and intent of cheating and de-
frauding Locke out of his just dues. He cannot in 
equity be permitted to take from the common construct-
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ion fund moneys he, in violation of his agreement, never 
earned. It is obvious from the contract and the record 
that Schnitzer was not intended to have this "financing 
fee" unless and until he had adequately and properly 
financed the project, and this he has never done-in-
stead he has bent every effort to cheat Locke out of 
his share. It would be most unjust to permit him to 
enrich himself with all of this "finance fee" when he 
has not performed the conditions which were prescribed 
as the consideration therefor. 
The most that equity and good conscience could 
permit Schnitzer to retain on a quantum meruit basis 
in view of this failure to 'earn the finance fee as con-
templated, would be legal interest at 6% on the amounts 
actually advanced during the few short months they 
were held by Harsh Utah Corporation and Irving Trust 
Company as escrow holder. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should 
increase the amount of the judgment in favor of re-
spondent by making a determination that under the 
terms and conditions of the agreement of October 4th, 
1951, between respondent and appellants, that the 
change orders between Harsh Utah Corporation and 
Harsh Investment Corporation should be computed to 
be $333,952.55. That in addition thereto, this Court 
should determine that appellants Schnitzer andjor 
Harsh should not be entitled to retain 10% of the 
amount of the bid as a "finance fee" because the same 
was not earned, and the consideration therefor has 
failed and was n'ever delivered as agreed, and because 
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it would be inequitable and unjust to allow him to enrich 
himself at Locke's expense without performing his part 
of the bargain. 
Respondent submits that this Court should amend 
the trial Court's decision and increase the Judgment 
in favor of respondent by one-half of the amounts set 
forth below: 
One-half of $276,700.00 ________________________________ $138,350.00 
One-half of the difference between the 
total valuation of the change order 
extras, $333,952.55, and the F. H. A. 
valuation, $178,672.00, said difference 
being $155,280.55 ------------------------------------------ 77,640.27 
$215,990.27 
which sum added to the trial Court's judgment of 
$147,905.00 makes a total judgment for Locke in the 
amount of $363,895.27, together with interest at the rate 
of 8% from the 31st day of December, 1954. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN M. SHERMAN, 
Suite 212 California Bank Building, 
15 North Oakland, 
Pasadena, California 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASSMAN, 
By PAUL THATCHER, 
First Security Bank Building, 
Ogden, Utah 
Counsel for Intervening Plaintiff and 
respondent. 
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MR. GOLDBERG, A. C. P. A., TESTIFIES AS TO 
BOOKS AND RECORDS OF HARSH UTAH 
CORPORATION AND HARSH INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION AS FOLLOWS 
(T. 549-551) (T. 594) 
BY MR. SHERMAN: 
Q. Now, Mr. Goldberg, from your examination of 
the books and records of Harsh Montana, Harsh Utah, 
Harsh Construction, and Harsh Investment Company, 
do you have an opinion as to whether or not thos'e books 
were kept and maintained to accurately reflect the in-
come and cost of the construction of the Harsh Montana 
Great Falls Air Force Base housing project, and the 
Hill Field Air Force Base project here in Utah in ac-
cordance with the generally accepted methods of account-
ing on construction jobs? 
A. I'll say that they do not clearly and truly reflect 
the true income and cost and expenses of the resp'ective 
corporations in conformity with general accounting prin-
ciples, and further I would say in conformity with the 
revenue laws. 
Q. Now, Mr. Goldberg, do you have an opinion from 
your examination as to wheth'er or not any of those 
corporations ever did at any time truly and accurately 
so reflect upon their books and records the construction 
income and construction cost? 
A. At one time, at the beginning of the corporation, 
Harsh Montana, the construction corporation, Harsh 
Construction Company_! correct that, the books and 
records were kept in accordance with standard account-
ing principles to reflect the income and expenses, the 
income monthly. By that I mean each month according 
to the progress of the contract and the progress of the 
job, the amount earn'ed according to the pay estimate 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
from the contractor or the owner and as approved hy 
the FHA on their pay estimate was reflected to sho~ 
the amount due, the amount retained, and the income 
'earned for the period. This was done for several months 
and then discontinued, and at the end of the first period 
I would say at the end of the second fiscal period, I 
don't think the books wer'e closed in my opinion the first 
year until Mr. Ellis came in, in 1952 after the clos'e of 
the first fiscal year, and there was an over-lapping of 
two fiscal periods, reversals were made journal entries 
were made reversing out some of this income, and throw-
ing a profit of one period into a substantial loss by cor-
recting journal entries. I did not examine the tax 
returns; that was not my purpose, but it was seen in 
examining the general books and records. 
Q. Do you have any notes that would establish the 
amount of profit eliminated on this journal entry and 
when the journal entry was madeY 
A. I have a memorandum I think this referred to 
'53. I'm not certain. I think the records will show, if 
they have them her1e. Journal entry '53; 10, 15, the 
surplus, the original surplus account was credited and 
a loss was substituted. I think for the amount of 
$210,142.54. There were several journal entries made 
to effect this, and the explanation was that it was done 
on the advice of tax counsel. I did not investigate this 
any further. It was not my purpose or my jurisdiction, 
and I just made a comment on it. 
Q. Now, Mr. Goldberg, insofar as the books and 
records of Harsh Investment Company were concerned, 
w'ere they at any time set up even at the beginning to 
truly and accurately reflect the income and disburse-
ments of that particular construction company? 
A. I would say the income was not reflected cor-
rectly. 
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Q. It was not reflected in accordance with the 
generally accepted methods of accounting1 
A. That's correct. 
(T. 594) 
BY MR. SHERMAN: 
Q. Now, Mr. Goldberg, is it as Mr. King has at-
tempted to suggest to you that the proceeds received 
from Irving Trust in any way, shape or form from an 
accounting procedure, legal procedure, or any other way, 
income1 
A. It's definitely not income. It's a liability. It's 
a mortgage payable. It's definitely not income. 
Q. And it's exactly in the same category in this ac-
counting and this procedure as a mortgage that I might 
carry on my house. · 
GLLE.Y-2 
A. Exactly. 
Q. And there is no difference. 
A. That's true. 
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ON CROSS EXAMINATION MR. WALTER 
HUTCIDNSON, ONE OF THE ATTORNEYS FOR 
APPELLANTS, TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS PER-
TAINING TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
PROJECT COST AND CONSTRUCTION COST 
( T. 339-342) 
CROSS EOCAMINATION 
BY MR. SHERMAN: 
Q. Now, there is a difference, isn't there, Mr. Hutch-
inson, between project cost and construction cost 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what different items are taken into con-
sideration when you are considering only construction 
costs~ In other words, what items do you eliminate 
from the cost of the project to determine the construc-
tion cost? 
A. Well, her'e the construction costs are all lumped 
together. 
Q. Well now -. 
A. (Interposing) The Wherry project here. 
Q. Well, now, Mr. Hutchinson, you testified the 
project costs were so much, and these were, all these 
items were included in the cost of the project. You mean 
by that, I take it, that the project sitting up there cost 
so much money irresp'ective of who was to pay for it, 
whether it was to be the owner or contractor, isn't that 
correct~ 
A. Thats right. 
Q. And isn't it a fact that contract costs do not in-
clude FHA examination and inspection fees-that's not 
a part of construction cost as such, is it~ 
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A. Well, it wouldn't be on the construction contract. 
Q. It would not be in any circumstance. It would 
be an owner's obligation, isn't that tru'e~ 
A. Yes, that's true. 
Q. All right. And the same is true of loan fees, 
that's an owner's obligation and not a contractor's obli-
gation or cost, isn't that true 1 
A. That's true. 
Q. And legal fees, title fees, in connection with the 
mortgage is likewise a responsibility of the owner and 
not the contractor, isn't that true 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And architect's fees are an expense to the owner 
and not to the contractor, isn't that true 1 
A. That's right. 
Q. And interest on the mortgage advances is also 
an obligation of the own'er and not the contract, isn't 
that true~ 
A. Well, that is not always true, no. It just depends 
on how the contract is set up. In many instances, now, 
there is a setup under FHA here where they don't get 
insurance or advances until completion, where the con-
tractor is to carry himself during construction on this 
type job. 
Q. On this project, where there is progression pay-
ments made during the entire period of construction 
from the Irving Trust Company to the mortgagor, the 
interest on th'e mortgage advances is an obligation of 
the mortgagor corporation, isn't that true1 
A. That's true. 
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Q. And the FHA mortgage insurance is also an 
obligation of the mortgagor and not of the contractor. 
Is that not true 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And all of those items that I have just enumer-
ated are items on th'e books and records of Harsh Utah 
Corporation as an obligation of the Harsh Utah Corpo-
ration and were paid by Harsh Utah Corporation and 
not by Harsh Investment Company. Is that correct Y 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Now, there is no rule or regulation, is there, Mr. 
Hutchinson, insofar as the Federal Housing Adminis-
tration is concern'ed requiring a construction contract 
to be entered into between the owner and the contractor 
at any particular figure whatsoever? 
A. There are rules this way, that if-. 
Q. (Interposing) The only differences, Mr. Hutch-
inson-. 
MR. KING: 
(Interposing) Let him answer your question. 
Q. If the figure is not satisfactory, in this instance 
two million nine hundred ninety-five thousand dollars-
A. (Interposing) Yes. 
Q. - if it's any lower than that-. 
A. (Interposing) Yes. 
Q. - then th'e mortgagor puts up the difference 
between that and the FHA cost of replacement, isn't 
that true, in additional cash 7 
A. If the contract had been any more, then this 
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sponsor would have been required to put up mor'e 
money-. 
Q. (Interposing) Then there is no FHA require-
ment that sets the figure. 
A. No. 
Q. It's just the difference in the amount of cash put 
up by the sponsor. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. In other words, if there had been a variation in 
the contract price, the only difference would have been 
is that Harsh Utah Corporation or Mr. Schnitzer would 
have taken more money out of Harsh Montana or Pacific 
Coast Equipment Company or borrowed more money 
from his father-in-law and made the difference up in 
cash. Isnt that true~ 
A. That is true. 
Q. I have no further questions. 
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MR. ELLIS, THE COMPTROLLER FOR HARSH 
COMPANIES, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS CON-
CERNING FUNDS AVAILABLE! TO BUILD PRO-
JECT AND STATUS OF MORTGAGE 
(T. 1085-1087) 
BY MR. SHERMAN: 
Q. Then the figure I am talking about, Mr. Ellis, 
would be $3,409,971.81, would it not' 
A. I believe so. 
Q. Which would reflect all of the funds available 
through Irving Trust Company in any form at all for 
the total building of the project both in so far as ex-
penses of Harsh Utah Corporation, the owner, and 
Harsh Investment, the contractor, are conc'erned. Isn't 
that true~ 
A. That would reflect the total funds from all 
sources. 
THE COURT: $3,409,971.81. 
Q. Now, Mr. Ellis, you do not represent to this 
court, do you, that the original mortgage, as you have it 
here on exhibit 246 from an accounting standpoint is 
an income item, do you? 
A. No, sir; I do not. 
Q. And you h'eard Mr. Goldberg testify that a mort-
gage, from an accounting standpoint is strictly a liabil-
ity. Is that not true~ 
A. That's correct, secured lien. 
Q. And in order to reflect the true amount of in-
come you would have to take the true overall picture. 
Isn't that true? 
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A. What do you mean by "tru·e overall picture?" 
Q. Let's pin it down specifically, Mr. Ellis. In order 
to truly reflect-if you were to do so as an accountant 
on accounting principles, the income in the present case 
to Harsh Investment Corporation, you would not be 
concerned necessarily with mortgage money. Isn't that 
correcU 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And you would be concerned with the amount of 
the contract upon which a construction company con-
tracted to build a project, isn't that true 1 
A. That's true. 
Q. Without concern of where the money was coming 
from? 
A. Right. 
Q. And without concern as to what exp'enses the 
owner on his own account was obligated to defray over 
and above the construction contract itself. Isn't that 
true? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And the true amount of money as is testified to 
by Mr. Goldberg that the construction company is en-
titled to from th'e owner company is the amount of the 
construction contract plus the extras as set forth in the 
specifications covering the job. Isn't that correct? 
A. As to the extras, I can't say. I don't know 
whether the interpretation of those changes the contract 
automatically or not. I do know they ar'e entitled to 
the amount of the contract. 
Q. Have you taken that into consideration at all, 
Mr. Ellis, as to what the specifications provide on that 
particular subject 1 
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A. It's hard to say. I have never read that. 
Q. And its covered by article 15, changes in work 
of the specifications. Isn't that tru'e? 
MR. KING: Well, I object to this as not the best 
evidence. This witness said he has never read them 
and doesn't claim in any way to be able to interpret them. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
Q. You have not set up your books and records in 
so far as Harsh Investment Company's income is con-
cerned, taken into consideration the amount of the con-
tract or the amount that the contractor may be entitled 
to from the owner pursuant to the terms and conditions 
of article 15 of the specifications, have you? 
A. I have no such a thing as a contract receivable 
account at all. 
Q. And items you have put in here, I believe you 
testified before from this witness stand are the items 
you were directed to on your books and records by Mr. 
Schnitzer. 
A. As to income. 
Q. Yes. 
A. As income. I show the funds advanced over 
from Utah to Investment in sales advance account and 
close off the individual item. 
Q. But you do not reflect and you have not s'et up 
on the books of Harsh Investment Company the total 
amount of the funds that they are entitled to in relation-
ship to the contract and in relationship to the change_ 
orders under the sp'ecifications and particularly Article 
15 of the specifications. Isn't that correct?? 
A. There is no such contract receivable account set 
up. 
10 
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MR. W ARICK TESTIFIES RE 
ESCROW FUNDS AS FOLLOWS 
(T. 1117-1121) 
BY MR. SHER.MAN: 
Q. And what is the total amount of the cash re-
quired for carrying charges and financing 1 
A. The total cash for carrying charges and finan-
cing is $185,727.00. The total cash requirement for 
construction fees carrying charges and financing is 
$3,222,242.00. From that figure the amount of mortgage 
funds available are substracted leaving a difference of 
$585,442.00 which amount is deposited by the mortgagor 
to show that there are sufficient funds on hand to com-
plete the project. 
Q. Now, what is the FHA requirements in so far as 
that particular fund is concerned 1 
A. You mean in disbursing funds¥ 
Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Warwick, that that particular 
amount of money is deposited by th'e owner, the mort-
gagor say in this case, with the Irving Trust Company 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that money is to be used along with the 
proceeds of the mortgage to defray the total cost of the 
Hill Field Air Force Base proj'ect. Is that correct 1 
A. Yes, sir. That money is expended prior. That 
money is disbursed by the mortgagee, Irving Trust in 
this case, prior to the disbursement of any mortgage 
funds. 
Q. And is it not a fact, Mr. Warwick, that those 
funds are disburs'ed in accordance with the requisition 
of funds when the project is started¥ 
11 
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A. Those are disbursed upon submission of, as we 
call it, the title of the form, an application for insurance 
for mortgage proceeds. 
Q. And that is initiated by the contractor1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And I believe for purposes of identification that 
we have it as exhibit 141 the application for insurance 
advances of mortgage proceeds which is the method 
established, is it not, Mr. Warwick, for procuring these 
funds from month to month as the project progresses, 
from the bank, the Irving Trust Company for the pay-
ment of the sub-contractors, the contractor and the 
materialmen. 
A. It's the method of securing, of the mortgagor 
securing funds from the mortgagee to pay for work 
completed on the proj'ect and materials stored on site 
as determined by the contractor's requisitions and in-
ventories submitted being reconciled with the FHA in-
spector's report assigned to the project. 
Q. And that happ'ens each month periodically during 
the time that the project is being constructed. Is that 
correct~ 
A. Normally it's once a month. 
Q. And by policy the first money that is used or 
disbursed by Irving Trust Company toward the payment 
of these requisitions for material and work performed 
on th'e site, first monies that are used are these, this 
fund of $585,442.00 that you have been testifying about. 
Is that correct~ 
A. That's correct. That is disbursed first. 
Q. And those monies must be according to the rules 
and regulations of the Federal Housing Administration, 
12 
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and the policy of Irving Trust Company, be completely 
exhausted and spent to satisfy these requisitions prior 
to the time that any proceeds from the mortgage itself 
are expended. Is that right~ 
A. The escrow deposit must be entirely used before 
any of th'e mortgage funds are advanced. 
Q. And then as additional requisitions come in from 
month to month the progress payments are made until 
the entire project is completed. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And it's the policy, is it not, that certain reserves 
are withheld pending the final completion of the pro-
ject itself~ 
Yes, sir. 
Q. And what is that particular amount percentage-
wise? 
A. Ten percent of tile amount shown on the con-
tractor's requisition as approved by FHA. 
Q. Now, assuming the following facts, Mr. Warwick: 
If the owner corporation entered into a contract with a 
construction company, contracting corporation, to build 
the Hill Field Air Force Base project in accordance with 
the terms and conditions of the lump sum contract for 
$2,995,205.00, and assuming that tile mortgage is in the 
amount as you have testified to here, of $2,636,800.00, 
and that the escrow is in the amount of $585,442.00; and 
assuming further that this escrow was established, I 
believe in July, July 21 of 1952 and in November of 
1952 $300,000.00 was returned to the sponsor, in Feb-
ruary an additional $220,000.00 was returned to the 
13 
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sponsor, and in March an additional $104,000.00 was 
returned to the sponsor, making a total withdrawn out 
of funds from Irving Trust Company Bank to the spon-
sor individually, Harold J. Schnitzer, of $624,000.00, 
would there be sufficient funds left out of the total cash 
required for the compl'etion of the project, with which 
to pay the contractors and with which to pay the 
amounts that were necessary for the completion of the 
project~ 
MR. KING: Now, just a minute, Your Honor. That 
question is not including the facts which are in this case. 
It's incomplete on a numb'er of facts which have a ma-
terial bearing on the answer to the question. I specific-
ally have reference to the fact that both the contracting 
corporation and the owner management corporation are 
owned by the same person. 
THE COURT: This man understands that. 
MR. KING: That wasn't included in the question, 
Your Honor. It doesn't appear on this record. If this 
is going to be a hypothetical question, it has to include 
all the facts that ar'e material here. It can't just in-
clude part of them. 
THE COURT : That will be cross examination. I 
think the question includes the facts which are testified 
to. 
MR. KING: There is an additional fact that is not 
'included in it, and it is a mis-statement which is that 
Harold J. Schnitzer is the sponsor of this project. That 
is not th'e fact. The sponsor of this project is Harsh 
Investment Corporation. 
Q. Well, let's say that the money then in that respect 
was not returned to the sponsor but $624,000.00 was re-
turned to Harold J. Schnitzer individually. 
14 
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THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. He may 
answer. 
A. Based on our computation of what it would cost 
to complete this project, no there would not be sufficient 
funds. 
Q. Based upon the amount of the contract between 
the owner and contractor which provides for payment 
to the contractor of $2,995,205.00, ther'e would not be 
sufficient funds to make that payment. Is that correcU 
A. That's correct. 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MR. WALTER HUTCHINSON ON CROSS EX-
AMINATION BY MR. SHERMAN TESTIFIEn AS 
TO PAYMENT OF THE CONSTRUCTION CON-
TRACT-"LUMP SUM" AND CHANGE ORDERS 
AS FOLLOWS (T. 829-833) 
Q. The construction contract calls for a payment 
from the owner to the contractor of $2,995,205.00, 
doesn't itY 
A. I'll have to assume your figure is correct. I 
don't know. I haven't looked. 
Q. Let's not assum'e anything. 
A. All right. 
Q. I'm showing you what has been introduced here 
in evidence as exhibit number 61. That contract pro-
vides that the owner pay the contractor the sum of 
$2,995,205.00, doesn't it Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is the amount of money that is supposed 
to be paid, isn't it Y 
A. That's right. 
Q. And in addition to that, any approved extras 
contracted with between the owner and the contractor 
that are approved for a change of the plans and specifi-
cations or a change to article 15 of the sp·ecifications 
are in addition to that figure, aren't they~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, the purpose, as required by FHA and Irv-
ing Trust Company, of that escrow deposit is to assure 
FHA and Irving Trust Company that the owners will 
have enough funds on deposit with which to meet the re-
quirements to complete the entire project. Isn't that 
correctY 
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A. That together with the mortgage loan proceeds. 
Q. That together with the $2,636,000.00-som'e dol-
lars were to be used collectively to build the project out 
here at Hill Field, weren't they~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. And the reason for that money heing required 
to be deposited in escrow is to assure that the sub-con-
tractors and materialmen and the general contractor 
would have sufficient funds available to build the pro-
ject. Isn't that true 1 
A. That's corr'ect. 
Q. Now, how and in what manner, Hr. Hutchinson, 
could anybody connected with the building of the Hill 
Field Air Force base project determine in November of 
1952 whether or not $300,000.00 could be plucked out of 
Harsh Utah Corporation and still pay all the sub-con-
tractors, the general contractors, and the materialmen~ 
A. Why, I think very easily. The books of the 
corporation undoubtedly show it. 
Q. And it's your opinion that that is true1 
A. That is my opinion that's true, yes. 
Q. Is it your opinion that Harsh Utah Corporation 
could still pay Harsh Investment Corporation, the gen-
eral contractor, $2,995,205.00 plus extras and still drag 
out $624,000.00 of that escrow~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. As a matter of fact, it's practically impossible, 
is it not. 
A. L'et's take it a step at a time. I know that at the 
time that withdrawal was made there was funds left 
together with the approved extras to pay all persons 
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having claims for labor and material. 
Q. Including Harsh Investment Company, J\Ir. Hut-
chinson. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. That is your opinion 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you talking about up to November of 1952, 
or up to what date, Mrl Hutchinson 1 
A. L'et's see, the project was closed in June or July; 
July I think. July first. 
Q. The project began. 
A. I think so. 
Q. Began, and the mortgage was closed in the of-
fice of FHA on the 21st day of July 1952, and the 
mortgage was recorded on the 23rd day of July 1952, 
and in November of the same year $300,000.00 was with-
drawn. 
A. Yes. 
Q. In February of the following year $220,000.00. 
A. Let's go to that November withdrawal and think 
about that first. You see Mr. Schnitzer had already 
advanced for and on behalf of the corporation the sum 
of $25,000.00 for plans, $41,000.00 for plans. 
Q. Now, Mr. Hutchinson, let me interrupt you for 
just a moment. 
A. Yes. 
Q. All of that came back out of the $121,000.00 
first, the very same day? 
A. That's right part of it. 
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Q. That's the day the mortgage was signed. The 
$121,000.00 changed hands that day. 
A. Not $121,000.00; not anywheres n'ear. 
Q. You were there, were you not~ 
A. I was. 
Q. And it's your testimony that ther'e was not the 
sum of $121,000.00 and if the FHA reflected that sum, 
that that would be correct~ 
A. It would be. 
Q. If their records show that there were disburse-
ments paid back to Mr. Schnitzer that day totalling 
$121,000.00 broken down, I beli'eve, into different cate-
gories, but the total was that --. 
A. (Interposing) I would have to take a look at 
the figures and see. 
Q. For plans and architect fees that were paid up 
to that point or would have to be paid immediately, 
that's tru'e, isn't it~ 
A. Yes. 
MR. KING: 
You misunderstood, Mr. Hutchinson. He said plans. 
That is a different matter than architect fees. 
Q. Is there any difference in the charge for archi-
tect fees for one s'et of plans and another set of plans~ 
Architect fees are so much. 
A. There were, in addition to that $25,000.00, de-
posit made with the Air Force by Mr. Schnitzer per-
sonally. 
Q. For off-site improvem'ent bonds. 
A. No, for the privilege of getting the bid award 
here. 
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Q. Which was returned to him later on, wasn't itT 
A. I don't know whether that was handled through 
this or what. '-
Q. The procedure is that it all comes back to him. 
A. That's right, and that is when it was coming 
back to him. 
Q. So if by drawing out this $624,000.00 there wasn't 
enough money left to pay Harsh Investment Company 
$2,99·5,205.00 to pay the material men - $2,995,205.00 
plus extras - to pay the sub-contractors, then it would 
be up to Harold J. Schnitzer to dig down in his pocket 
to pay it, wouldn't it~ 
A. He has given a personal guarantee to do it. 
Q. He has given a personal guarantee to do that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't make a corporate resolution authoriz-
ing him to pull out the $300,000.00, did you, in N ovem-
ber of 1952~ 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't do it in February of 1953 for $220,-
000.00, did you¥ 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't do it in March for $104,000.00, did 
you? 
A. No. 
Q. You waited until June 10, 1954 at nine o'clock 
in the morning to do it in Dwight King's office, didn't 
you~ 
A. No. We did it on April first 1953. The matter 
of $624,000.00 
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Q. But never prepar'ed in written form, for tax 
purposes or any other purpose, to submit to anybody 
in connection with an income tax return withdrawal or 
anything else, it was never reduced to anything more 
than rough notes, if those~ 
A. That's right. 
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MR. W. HAROLD WARWICK, CHIEF MORTGAGE 
CREDIT EXAMINER FOR F.H.A., TESTIFIED 
REGARDING CONSTRUCTION CONTRAC11-
- "LUMP SUM" AS FOLLOWS 
(T. 1115-1116) (T. 1164) 
BY MR. SHERMAN: 
Q. Now, Mr. Warwick, does the F'ederal Housing 
Administration in any way concern itself with the amount 
that the owner corporation contracts with a contracting 
corporation for the building of a particular projecU 
A. Only in so far as it is within a reasonable figure, 
within reason. 
Q. Does the Federal Housing Administration in 
any way dictate what that particular figure has to beY 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What has b'een introduced as a photostatic copy 
of the lump sum contract, which is exhibit one, which 
I believe you have copies of there, Mr. Warwick, direct-
ing your attention to that document and the figure pro-
vided in there under the contract sum of $2,995,205.00, 
now pertaining to that particular figure, does the Fed-
eral Housing Administration in any way dictate to either 
the owner or the contractor the amount of that particular 
figure! 
A. No, sir. 
(T. 1164) 
MR. SHERMAN: 
One of the other things that has to be certified to 
is that the lump sum contract has been paid. Isn't that 
truef 
A. I believe that's correct. That is a question for 
our legal counsel. I don't know. 
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MR. HUTCHINSON TESTIFIES PERTAINING TO 
CHARGE ORDERS AS FOLLOWS (T. 347-350) 
BY MR. SHERMAN: 
Q. Now, in regard to these change orders, Mr. 
Hutchinson, the FHA as such is not inter'ested how much 
the owner pays the contractor to make a change as long 
as the change -- if it involves a change in the plans and 
specifications, FHA approves it, isn't that correcU 
A. Yes. The FHA is primarily concerned -
Q. (Interposing) Only to the point that if and when 
there is an application by the owner to increase the 
amount of the mortgage on that property, then FHA 
assesses the amount for estimates at the same time for 
the benefit of Irving Trust Company as to how much 
the change, total change on the property could be safely 
increased in the mortgage itself, and be insured by 
FHA. 
A. Again, they are just as concerned about a de-
crease, you see. 
Q. Yes. 
A. The legal effect of a change order is to change 
the construction contract by that much. 
Q. But there is nothing on this change order that 
tells the mortgagor or the owner that he can only pay the 
contractor so many dollars 1 
A. No, there is nothing on that. 
Q. And there is nothing on the change order, an 
endorsement at any time from FHA that in any way 
deals with financial amount of the change order itself 
as between the owner and contractor. Is ther'e? 
A. No, there is no change. It doesn't affect them. 
It's just to determine whether the FHA will accept the 
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propos'ed change at all and if so how much they will 
increase the insurance on the mortgage. 
Q. And the process of handling each individual 
change order, is that they are handled in this manner 
are they not~ They originate with the own·er, the mort-
gagor, and are prepared by the owner, are they not? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Then they are submitted to the contractor for 
approval by the contractor, itn't that true~ 
A. Erither the contractor or the owner. They origi-
nate then to the lender and then to the FHA. 
Q. Then they go directly to Irving Trust Company 
in New York for endorsement by the Irving Trust Com-
pany in the place provided for by the signature of the 
mortgagee, isn't that correct~ 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Then they go to the Federal Housing Adminis-
trator's office, in this case in Salt Lake City, Utah, to 
determine whether or not the particular requested 
change is a beneficial change to the property, and the 
plans and specifications can be changed accordingly, 
isn't that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And at no time during that procedure is FHA 
interested in any monetary transactions between the 
owner and the contractor as to how much the owner is 
going to pay the contractor for that particular change-. 
A. (Interposing) Well, -. 
Q. - until such time when the owner requests an 
increase in the mortgage, then it b'ecomes a factor, but 
not until that time, isn't that true? 
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A. Only to this extent. They are concerned with 
the mortgagor's ability. If the change orders indicate 
that the mortgagor corporation is going to b'e obligated 
to pay more than the construction contract, or increased 
by more than ten percent, then the FHA becomes con-
cerned on that, then they may have to increas'e the con-
struction bond for performance on the construction of 
the project. 
Q. Then it becomes a bonding transaction. 
A. That's right. 
Q. It doesn't have anything to do with the amount 
of money that is going to be paid to the owner of the 
contract, does it~ 
A. No. 
Q. The change order says on the face of it by 
executing it whether it's an increase or decrease in the 
mortgage, if it's an incr'ease whether the mortgage is 
increased or not, the mortgagor agrees to pay for the 
change, isn't that true~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. No further questions. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KING: 
Q. I just have one question, Mr. Hutchinson. The 
lump sum contract you have been talking about, as I 
understand it, will n'ever be amended in amount. That 
is a fixed amount. 
A. That's right. 
MR. SHERMAN: 
But it's amended is it not, Mr. Hutchinson, by any 
change order~ 
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A. That is entirely between the parties. 
MR. SHERMAN: 
The lump sum contract itself provides that the 
contractor, at the time of the execution of that lump sum 
contract, agrees with the owner to build that project in 
accordance with the plans and specifications then in 
existence, isn't that true~ 
A. Thats the way it reads, yes. 
MR. SHERMAN: 
And if there is any change in the plans and specifi-
cations which are represented by these change orders, 
then that is a change in the plans and specifications, and 
a change in which the contractor is entitled to an increase 
accordingly, is that not true~ 
A. It could be that way, yes. 
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MR. WARWICK TESTIFIED PERTAINING TO 
CHANGE ORDERS BETWEEN HARSH UTAH 
CORPORATION AND HARSH INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION AS FOLLOWS (T. 1123-1125) 
BY MR. SHERMAN: 
Q. Mr. Warwick, in regard to the change orders, is 
the Federal Housing Administration concerned or in-
terested as b'etween the owner and the contractor as to 
the amount of these change orders, between the owner 
and the contractor as such 1 
A. Not in making our determination, only in so far 
as reasonableness of the figur'es are concerned. 
Q. And isn't it a fact that the FHA is not concerned 
with transactions taking place between an owner and a 
contractor to perform as to the amount required as to 
perform a particular change¥ 
A. By that you mean what 1 
Q. The FHA do'es not in any way dictate to the 
owner what the owner can pay a contractor to perform 
a particular change. 
A. No. 
Q. The FHA is required under this particular pro-
cedure, is it not, if it involves a change in the plans and 
specifications from the architectural section to approve 
that prior to the time the change can be made 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And then the subsequent assuming that it has 
been approved, the subsequent negotiations between the 
mortgagor and the FHA in so far as finances are con-
cern'ed, is only for the purposes of determining, at the 
final closing after the project has been complete, how 
much if any increase will be granted by the FHA as 
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mortgage insurance. Isn't that correct 1 
A. It's assuming that the changes involve increas·es. 
Q. Assuming that the changes have been approved 
from an architectural standpoint, the plans and specifi-
cations have been changed accordingly and FHA has 
approved those changes, and assuming that thos'e partic-
ular changes involve an expenditure of an additional sum 
in some amount, then the negotiations between the 
owner and FHA are for the purposes of determining 
how much increase in mortgage insurance will be grant-
ed, isn't that correct~ 
A. How much, if any. 
Q. If any. And that is not based upon the amount of 
money that the owner may or may not have paid the 
contractor for performing that particular change, FHA 
do'es not dictate or control that particular figure, does 
it? 
A. No. 
Q. In other words, isn't it a fact that the owner 
comes in and says that he has these changes, that they 
have been made, the changes themselves have be'en ap-
proved, representing to your organization that the owner 
has paid the contractor, that the changes have cost the 
owner so much money~ 
A. Well, these changes are approved or disapproved 
by FHA on the assumption, yes, that there is either 
some additional cost or some decrease in cost. 
Q. And the negotiations are made for the increase 
in the mortgage itself. Isn't that correct, and the in-
surance covering the mortgage~ 
A. That would be in order. 
Q. But that figure that the mortgage may be in-
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creased in no way determines the amount of money that 
the owner is to pay the contractor for a particular change 
or group of changes, does it~ 
A. Unless that was the agre'ement between the 
owner and the contractor, no. 
Q. But in so far as any information in your files 
are concerned, that does not appear to be the case. Is 
that correct~ 
A. I do not believe we have any information on that 
point. 
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MR. ARTHUR W. ISAKSON, CONSTRUCTION 
INSPECTOR FOR F. H. A. TESTIFIED REGARD-
ING CHANGE ORDERS AS FOLLOWS (T. 279-280) 
BY MR. SHERMAN: 
Q. Y'es, Mr. Isakson. Now, from that document can 
you ascertain what the total amount was of the change 
orders requested by Harsh Utah Corporation and ap-
proved for work to be done or work done on the Hill 
Field Air Force Base by the Federal Housing Admin-
istration with reference to the changes one through 79, 
does that document that you have indicate what the total 
amount of money was on approved change orders as 
evaluated by Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh In-
vestment Company7 
A. The total that I have here is the amount as re-
quested by the mortgagor on the change orders that 
were approved subject, of course, to any omissions or 
errors that were inadvertently made. 
Q. Now, what is the total amount of those approved 
change orders as requested by Harsh Utah Corporation Y 
A. $279,126.00 
Q. Now, that I understand, Mr. Isakson, is all of 
t11e approved change orders to date, is that correct? 
A. That is as it is today. 
Q. Now, in addition to that, is there a change order 
upon which Harsh Utah Corporation has requested re-
consideration for approval Y 
A. There is. 
Q. And do you know what the number of that par-
ticular change order is! 
A. Number 77. 
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RE CHANGE, ORDER 77 MR. ISAKSON 
TESTIFIED ON PAGES 435-436 AS FOLLOWS 
BY MR. SHERMAN: 
Q. All right. Mr. Isakson, that same change order 
repr'esents to your office, does it not, that the Harsh 
Construction Company represents that their cost and 
expenditures to effect the change covered by this change 
order, according to their computation and evaluation, 
would b'e in the sum of $54,719.67. Isn't that correct~ 
A. There was a corrected figure here of $106.88. 
This was the new total. 
Q. Then the total put on there by Harsh Utah Cor-
poration representing to your office that this change 
order would cost $54,826.55 is the figur'e and is the repre-
sentation made by that corporation to F. H. A. Isn't 
that correct ¥ 
A. This is Mr. Schnitzer's figure, and this is mine, 
the total. 
Q. The total submitted though and represented by 
Harsh Investment Company, I notice has-that is Harold 
J. Schnitzer's initials. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Indicating that lie added to the figure of 
$54,719.67 in his own handwriting the figure of $106.88 
with the initials H. S. by it. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And the word "total" is yours. 
A. No. 
Q. Who put the word "total" in there, if you remem-
ber~ 
A. I believe Mr. Schnitzer. 
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Q. And the total of the two figures in red there of 
$54,826.55 is yours. 
A. That's correct. 
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MR. ELLIS TESTIFIES CONCERNING WITH-
DRAWAL OF FUNDS BY SCHNITZER 
(T. 1094-1095) 
BY MR. SHERMAN: 
Q. Now, isn't it also true, Mr. Ellis, that if the 
original escrow funds deposited pertaining to the Hill 
Field Air Force Base project in the original instance at 
the date of closing of th'e mortgage which I beleive that 
we have had identified here as being approximately 
$624,000.00. Isn't that correct? 
A. I think that's correct. 
Q. Now, $300,000.00 of those funds had been with-
drawn in November 1952 by Mr. Schnitzer, and 
$220,000.00 withdrawn in February of 1953 by Mr. 
Schnitzer, and anotller $104,000.00 withdrawn in March 
of 1953 by Mr. Schnitzer, which I believe you testified to, 
and I beleive it's your testimony that totals $624,000.00 
withdrawals in that period of time, that there would not 
have been sufficient funds available to both Harsh Utah 
Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation to com-
pletely carry out the terms and conditions of the lump 
sum contract whereby Harsh Utah Corporation could 
pay to Harsh Investment Company the sum of 
$2,995,205.00 and still be sufficient funds to pay the 
items to be paid by Harsh Utah Corporation as set up 
on your books. 
A. I can't deny that. 
Q. And then it would not have be'en necessary to 
have gone through these Inter-company transfers here 
that you speak of and that you have outlined on exhibit 
number 247. 
A. That's right. 
Q. No further questions. 
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HAROLD J. SCHNITZER TESTIFIED RE PAY-
MENT OF· CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT-"LUMP 
SUM" AND FUNDS AVAILABLE TOO BUILD HILL 
AIR FORCE BASE! HOUSING PROJECT AS 
FOLLOWS (T. 989-992) 
BY MR. SHERMAN: 
Q. Is it your purpose, Mr. Schnitz'er, to convev to 
this court that you were to have no funds of your 'own 
in these projects and that you were only to spend FHA 
mortgage insured funds to construction the projects? 
MR. KING: 
I object to it as calling for a conclusion and un-
intelligible and goes to the very qu'estion that Your 
Honor had to decide. 
THE COURT: 
The objection is overruled. 
A. I have never on this stand attempted to convey 
that impression, Mr. Sherman. I have n'ever made any 
statement to that effect. 
Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Schnitzer, that you have re-
peatedly said that the only income and the only funds 
available for the construction of the Hill Field Force 
Bas'e project was the amount of the mortgage' 
A. The mortgage was intended to be the funds with 
which the project was to be built, yes. 
Q. And you know that in addition to that bid the 
FHA requirements were that you were required to put 
additional mon'ey up of your own funds, isn't that trueT 
A. That was always understood, escrow fund. 
Q. The escrow fund, and for payment of certain 
costs of the owner-management corporation totalling 
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$585,000.00 on the Hill Field Air Force Base Project. 
Isn't that true 1 
A. In so far as FHA is conc'erned, those funds can 
be used to pay off any obligation, yes. 
Q. And they are to pay off the cost of the project 
that the owner was to pay, according to your own wit-
ness' testimony, Mr. Hutchinson. Isn't that true 1 
A. If the project cost exceeds the mortgage dis-
burs'ements the escrow funds are supposed to be avail-
able for that purpose. 
Q. And they are supposed to be available further 
for the purpose of paying the lump sum contract entered 
into with the contractor. Isn't that true 1 
A. No. That is not necessarily true. 
Q. It's certainly tru'e according to FHA rules and 
regulations. Isn't it, Mr. Schnitzer 1 
A. I don't believe that the FHA regulations that I 
have ever seen state that. 
Q. Now, Mr. Schnitzer, you know what the lump sum 
contract provides. It provides the owner manag'er pay 
the contractor $2,995,205.00 doesn't it 1 
A. That is the figure of the contract, yes. 
Q. And prior to the time that figure was placed in 
that contract in July of 1952, you had signed an identical, 
except for the figure, lump sum contract in th'e State of 
Montana, hadn't you 1 
A. That's true. 
Q. And you knew every provision in those contracts. 
A. I have so testified when we signed the Montana 
contract I became familiar with the lump sum contract. 
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Q. And that was in March of 1951 that you signed 
the Montana contract~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. And you signed the one in Utah in July of 1952. 
A. July 1952, correct. 
Q. And you knew what the terms and conditions of 
this contract was and the contract provided in the Utah 
contract that the owner, Harsh Utah Corporation, would 
pay to the contractor $2,995,205.00. Isn't that correct. 
A. That's right. 
Q. On the original plans and specifications. 
A. That's right. 
Q. In order to do that it would be necessary to have 
the mortgage money you receive plus the additional 
funds of the escrow, wouldn't it? 
A. To do whatt 
Q. To pay the contract of $2,995,205.00. 
Not necessarily. 
Q. How else could it be paid, Mr. Schnitzer' 
A. Paid in tlle manner followed by many of these 
sponsors. 
Q. I'm asking you how on the Hill Field Air Force 
Base project. 
MR. KING: 
If ~{r. Sherman will permit Mr. Schnitzer to answer 
the question, he might get an answer. He can't get an 
answer if he talks all the time. 
Q. I'm asking you, Mr. Schnitz'er, how could the Hill 
Field Air Force Base project sponsor, Harsh Utah Com-
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pany pay to Harsh Investment Company $2,995,205.00 
without putting additional funds in over and above the 
mortgage amount of money~ 
A. They can do it in the manner approved by the 
FHA. 
Q. And the FHA is not concerned with how it's 
done, and t:lle only thing that you are required to do in 
so far as that is concerned is to certify to the FHA at 
the time it's closed finally and turned over to Fanny 
Mae, that the contractor has been paid and that all the 
sub-contractors and materialmen have been paid, isn't 
that tru'e1 
A. You are absolutely right. 
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l\IR. ELLIS TESTIFIES RE WITHDRAWAL OF 
FUNDS BY SCHNITZER AND PAYMENT OF 
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT - "LUMP SUM" 
(T. 424, 425) 
BY MR. SHERMAN: 
Q. And you are familiar with the fact, are you not, 
Mr. Ellis, that the lump sum contract entered into on 
the 21st day of July of 1952 between Harsh Investment 
Corporation and Harsh Utah Corporation calls for the 
payment of funds of Harsh Utah Corporation to Harsh 
Investment Company of $2,995,205.00. Isn't that correct? 
A. That I think is tile lump sum price. 
Q. And it would be absolutely impossible for Harsh 
Utah Corporation to carry out the terms and conditions 
of that agreement with Harsh Investment Corporation 
after having been paid out Mr. Harold J. Schnitzer the 
sum of $624,000.00 between November of 1952 and March 
24, of 1953, wouldn't it? 
A. I don't b'elieve it would. 
Q. How could it have been done by funds available 
to Harsh Utah Corporation? 
A. If you refer to cash, that is one thing. 
Q. I am referring to cash. The contract doesn't 
refer to it being paid in automobiles, does it? 
A. The contract specifies tile amount of $4,995,000.00 
Q. Of cash. 
A. However, Harsh Investment Company hasn't 
received $2,995,000.00. 
Q. And when they receive all of the money, the ten 
percent withheld in Irving Trust Companys hands, they 
still will not have received $2,995,000.00, will they¥ 
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A. No. 
Q. Because they have paid in the meantime 
$624,000.00 out to Mr. Harold J. Schnitzer, didn't they~ 
A. That is not the reason they will not rec'eive that 
amount of money. They will not receive $2,995,000.00. 
Q. Because the mortgage is $2,600,000.00. 
A. Yes. 
Q. In other words, to make up the difference th'ere 
would have to be additional funds available to Harsh 
Utah Corporation. Isn't that true~ 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And those additional funds were originally 
placed in escrow, were they not~ 
A. I b'elieve they are. 
Q. And then they were paid back out of the escrow 
to Mr. Harold J. Schnitzer between November of 1952 
to March 24, 1953, isn't that correct~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. And they were not then available to make pay-
ment from the Harsh Utah Corporation to Harsh In-
vestment Company, were they~ 
A. No. 
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LOCKE RE CONSTRUCTION COSTS AND PRO-
JECT COSTS DETERMINATION OF PROFIT 
(T. 794, 795) 
BY MR. KING: 
Q. And then you also discussed with him the fact 
that you might want to include rental income and add it 
to the amount of the mortgage payment to bring up the 
amount of money available to pay costs so that if thete 
was a possibility of profit that would be taken into ac-
count. · 
A. Mr. King, I knew what that project cost was, 
and I knew what the contract value was. I knew very 
well there was profit. 
Q. You knew all the costs too, did you not 1 
A. Absolutely, I knew exactly what th'e costs were, 
and I knew what the contract value was. 
Q. That's all I want to know, Mr. Locke. Thank you 
very much. 
BY MR. SHERMAN: 
Q. What was said on that particular occasion that 
Mr. King has just referred to about rental income, if 
anything. 
A. We had spent fifty or sixty thousand dollars in 
Montana overtime that he was charging on the construc-
tion company. I didn't fe'el it would be fair to penalize 
the contractor for that expenditure, and that is when ~e 
said the rental income would be calculated. 
Q. Now, Mr. Locke, do you know approximately how 
much money was spent in Utah on Hill Field Air Force 
Base project on overtime alone~ 
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A. I would say close to 45 to 50 thousand dollars. 
Q. Now, Mr. Locke, did your conferences in Wash-
ington pertain to the mortgage increases on the change 
orders in any way have anything to do in regard to the 
value of those sam'e change orders between Harsh 
Montana Corporation the owner and Harsh Construction 
the builder 1 
A. Oh, absolutely not. 
Q. What did they pertain to 1 
A. A mortgage increase for the owner. 
Q. That's all. 
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1IR. GOLDBERG TESTIFIES IN RE MORTGAGE 
PROCEEDS AND INCOME (T. 571, 572) 
MR. KING 2: 
Q. That's why I want to get Mr. Goldberg and me 
straightened out as to who got $2,995,000.00. 
THE COURT: 
Harsh Investment is yet to get it or has got it. 
A. That's true. 
Q. From Harsh Utah Corporation. 
A. That's true. 
Q. Now, Mr. Goldberg, then this sum of money 
which the Irving Trust Company is to pay this amount 
of $279,000.00, that isn't payable to Harsh Investment at 
all, is it? 
A. No. 
Q. That's to Harsh Utah. 
A. That's true. 
Q. To [So n this figure $2,995,000.00 income to 
Harsh Investment isn't in the same category. 
A. Absolutely two differ'ent categories. One is 
liability and the other income. 
Q. All right. Now, let's go along here; then as I 
understand it we've got one thing straightened out when 
you say gross income contract price we ar·e talking about 
gross income to Harsh Investment Corporation. 
A. That's true. 
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J[R. GOLDBERG TESTIFIES IN RE THE CARD 
GREAVES REPORT- EX. 182 (T. 591) 
MR. KING 2: 
Q. Is only that you have included in your report-. 
A. (Interposing) Mr. King, I said his report does 
not reflect the net profit or loss under the resp'ective 
contracts. All there is in there are costs. 
Q. That is as I understand it. And he didn't claim 
to have an audit which showed the income. 
A. Who didn't claim? 
Q. Mr. Gr'eaves in this report. 
A. No, Absolutely not. I testified to that. 
Q. Now, he had an audit when you were up there, 
did he not? 
A. Mr. Greaves told me he had never seen the con-
tract. He didn't know what the income to the construc-
tion company was. He didn't know what the change 
orders are. He was instructed just to prepare a state-
ment showing the cost of both corporations and that is 
what he did. 
Q. He had an audit to show you income figure 
though, didn't he? 
A. He did not. 
Q. Didn't he show you that figure? 
A. Absolutely not. 
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